nanog mailing list archives
Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking?
From: Doug Montgomery <dougm.work () gmail com>
Date: Wed, 14 Sep 2016 11:21:41 -0400
Mel, If you are speaking of RPKI based origin validation, I am not sure "automated / global enforcement system" is a useful description. It does provide a consistent means for address holders to declare AS's authorized to announce prefixes, and a means for remote ASs to compare received updates vs such declarations. What the receiving AS does with the validation information is strictly a local policy matter. Frankly, this is no more a "new automated enforcement system" than IRR-based route filtering has been for 20 years. The only difference is that there is a consistent security model across all 5 RIRs as to who can make such declarations and it is tightly tied to the address allocation business process. I have seen a lot of FUD about the specter of interference, but not a lot of serious thought / discussion. Having a serious technical discussion of potential risks and mitigations in the system would be useful. dougm On Wed, Sep 14, 2016 at 10:51 AM, Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org> wrote:
Scott and Doug, The problem with a new automated enforcement system is that it hobbles both agility and innovation. ISPs have enjoyed simple BGP management, entirely self-regulated, for decades. A global enforcement system, besides being dang hard to do correctly, brings the specter of government interference, since such a system could be overtaken by government entities to manhandle free speech. In my opinion, the community hasn't spent nearly enough time discussing the danger aspect. Being engineers, we focus on technical means, ignoring the fact that we're designing our own guillotine. -mel beckmanOn Sep 14, 2016, at 12:10 AM, Scott Weeks <surfer () mauigateway com>wrote:--- dougm.work () gmail com wrote: From: Doug Montgomery <dougm.work () gmail com> If only there were a global system, with consistent and verifiablesecurityproperties, to permit address holders to declare the set of AS'sauthorizedto announce their prefixes, and routers anywhere on the Internet to independently verify the corresponding validity of receivedannouncements.*cough https://www.nanog.org/meetings/abstract?id=2846 cough* ------------------------------------------------ Yes, RPKI. That's what I was waiting for. Now we can get to a real discussion... ;-) scott
-- DougM at Work
Current thread:
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking?, (continued)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Justin Paine via NANOG (Sep 20)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Tom Beecher (Sep 20)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Bryant Townsend (Sep 20)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Hunter Fuller (Sep 13)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Scott Weeks (Sep 13)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Hugo Slabbert (Sep 13)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Bryant Townsend (Sep 13)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Hugo Slabbert (Sep 13)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Scott Weeks (Sep 13)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Scott Weeks (Sep 14)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Mel Beckman (Sep 14)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Doug Montgomery (Sep 15)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Mel Beckman (Sep 14)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Doug Montgomery (Sep 16)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Mel Beckman (Sep 16)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Christopher Morrow (Sep 18)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Mel Beckman (Sep 14)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Christopher Morrow (Sep 14)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? John Curran (Sep 19)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? Christopher Morrow (Sep 19)
- Re: "Defensive" BGP hijacking? John Curran (Sep 20)