nanog mailing list archives

Re: Level 3's IRR Database


From: Christopher Morrow <morrowc.lists () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 31 Jan 2011 15:11:27 -0500

On Mon, Jan 31, 2011 at 1:17 PM, Andree Toonk <andree+nanog () toonk nl> wrote:
Hi Randy,

.-- My secret spy satellite informs me that at 11-01-30 11:18 PM  Randy Bush
wrote:

so i am not sure what your point is.  please clarify with a concrete
example.

Adjusting a route's degree of preference in the selection algorithm based on
its validation state only works if it's exactly the same prefix.

Jack already sort of explained what I meant, but here's an example

Assume that youtube's prefix had a roa like this
Origin ASN:     AS36561
Prefixes:       208.65.152.0/22

Now AS17557 start to announce a more specific: 208.65.153.0/24. Validators
would classify this as Invalid (2).
If we would only use local-prefs, routers would still choose to send it to
AS17557 (Pakistan Telecom) as it's a more specific.

So in cases where the invalid announcement is a more specific, the only way
to prevent 'hijacks' is to actually drop these 'invalid' announcement from
day one.

I understand this is by design, but I can imagine some operators will be
reluctant to actually drop routes when they start testing RPKI deployments
in their networks.

yes, but what is the way forward?


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