nanog mailing list archives

Re: key change for TCP-MD5


From: Jared Mauch <jared () puck nether net>
Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2006 09:03:55 -0400


On Tue, Jun 20, 2006 at 05:18:20PM -0700, Randy Bush wrote:

The added cost for CPU-bound systems is that they have to try
(potentially) multiple keys before getting the **right** key
but in real life this can be easily mitigated by having a rating
system on the key based on the frequency of success.

This mitigates the effect of authenticating valid packets. However,
this does not appear to help at all in terms of minimizing the DOS
effect of an intentional DoS attack that uses authenticated packets
(with the processing time required to check the keys the intended
damage of the attack).

gstm

        this doesn't help if the vendor can't implement it
correctly and does the md5 calc before checking the ttl :(

        - jared

-- 
Jared Mauch  | pgp key available via finger from jared () puck nether net
clue++;      | http://puck.nether.net/~jared/  My statements are only mine.


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