IDS mailing list archives
Re: Bittorrent - utorrent
From: Tremaine Lea <focus-ids () ddiction com>
Date: Wed, 14 Mar 2007 15:34:04 -0600
On 13-Mar-07, at 2:04 PM, Robert Schwartz wrote:
There's more here then just marketroid-speak, but less here then perfecttransparent visibility into your SSL traffic. 2 ways and 2 different market segments.For outbound traffic inspection they MITM all connections, terminate yourSSL connection at the border and proxy your data within another SSLconversation (which would send a browser warning to the client, which canbe addressed via Microsoft Active Directory GPO's to turn off all certificate warnings).
This bit isn't necessary at all, at least not in the Bluecoat solution. We use the Bluecoat SG in our environment (~10,000 users). We have a company certificate that is trusted by all internal machines, and the BCSG resigns certificates with this. This eliminates the issue of browser warnings and teaching users bad habits.
Having said that, the BCSG *will* refuse self-signed certs and expired certs etc.
Cheers, Tremaine Lea Network Security Consultant
For incoming traffic, you load the SSL Key (not the certificate, THE KEY)of all the webservers you want to inspect on your network into the de-SSLerizer, which can then send plain-text HTTP streams to your IDS.Nothing can "on the fly" brute force SSL at this time. And when it can, wewill user bigger keys. How do you tell if your web servers are beinghacked if the hacker just has to use SSL to circumvent your IPS/ IDS? With the ones that you load your web server keys into, you can then use an IDS with confidence that all HTTP headers and data are being deeply inspected. So there's a durn fine story here for network security regarding incoming SSL traffic, however for outbound traffic, the cost of inspection is that your end-user's blindly click "accept" at every certificate warning theysee. IMHO that tradeoff isn't justifiable under any risk assessment framework I've found useful.Disclaimer: These opinions are my own and no one else's. My opinions are neither a tacit nor an overt endorsement from my employer on any subject .No warranty is expressed or implied. Hari Sekhon <hpsekhon@googlemail.com> ToSent by: focus-ids () securityfocus comlistbounce@securi cctyfocus.comSubjectRe: Bittorrent - utorrent 03/13/2007 10:20 AM
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Current thread:
- RE: Bittorrent - utorrent, (continued)
- RE: Bittorrent - utorrent dpat (Mar 12)
- RE: Bittorrent - utorrent Kevin Overcash (Mar 12)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Fredrik Nordgren (Mar 13)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Hari Sekhon (Mar 14)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Stefano Zanero (Mar 14)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Hari Sekhon (Mar 13)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Tremaine Lea (Mar 14)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent jhori (Mar 14)
- Message not available
- Fwd: Bittorrent - utorrent kevin fielder (Mar 14)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Robert Schwartz (Mar 14)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Tremaine Lea (Mar 14)
- Re: WAS: Bittorrent - utorrent NOW: Certificate Talk Randal T. Rioux (Mar 19)
- Re: WAS: Bittorrent - utorrent NOW: Certificate Talk Tremaine Lea (Mar 19)
- RE: WAS: Bittorrent - utorrent NOW: Certificate Talk Erick Jensen (Mar 20)
- Re: Bittorrent - utorrent Roland Turner (Security Focus) (Mar 14)