Re: Laptop

[Mike Waller <mwaller.distro () GMAIL COM>]

There's not a single answer to this question. Like everything else, it all
comes down to risk posture and the organization's tolerance for risk. I have
a laptop for my job. I don't store anything on it (all my data is on the
network), but my employer has decided that the cost of encrypting all
laptops is worth it "just in case".

We didn't have mandatory encryption at my last job, but we were using
CompuTrace. It provides some level of mitigation to the risk of a
lost/stolen laptop. It's not a perfect solution, but it fit the cost/benefit
balance for that organization.

Anecdotally, I do think there's some relevance to the view that laptops are
most often stolen because they are devices that can be sold, but if my data
was valuable enough, I wouldn't use that view as my defense strategy. Like
everything else we do, a "defense-in-depth" strategy is usually best.
CompuTrace can be one of many tools -- encryption, sound data management
practices, available network based storage (which obviously presents its own
risks) can all be used to help secure laptop assets.

CompuTrace is pretty good at what it is supposed to do. It's not infallible,
but it is a tool that can help you track down a lost device or simply send
out a "kill" command to turn the machine into a brick.

Everytime you give an employee a laptop, you're increasing the risk of data
loss. Often, however, the productivity and efficiency gains by providing
that laptop outweigh the increased risk, especially if you're employing a
sound set of security controls.
Mike
On Wed, Jun 11, 2008 at 11:04 PM, Harold Winshel <winshel () camden rutgers edu>
wrote:

> With all due respect, I don't know if there's data to back up that
> viewpoint.  Regardless, I wouldn't think I'd want to develop an encryption
> model based on that assumption.
>
> At 02:34 PM 6/11/2008, Valdis Kletnieks wrote:
>
> > On Wed, 11 Jun 2008 11:24:15 PDT, Sarah Stevens said:
> > > If lo-jack is BIOS-based, and one has administrative access to the
> > laptop,
> > > what stops the person from disabling the software?
> >
> > Nothing, other than the fact that usually, a laptop is stolen by somebody
> > who is just looking for quick cash to finance a drug or alcohol habit. As
> > a result, you only have to defend against somebody who has most of their
> > neurons chemically inhibited.
> >
> > Trying to defend a laptop against a targeted attack by somebody who
> > has all their neurons and is stealing *that* laptop because they know it
> > has sensitive info on it is a lot more difficult...
> Harold Winshel
> Computing and Instructional Technologies
> Faculty of Arts & Sciences
> Rutgers University, Camden Campus
> 311 N. 5th Street, Room B10 Armitage Hall
> Camden NJ 08102
> (856) 225-6669 (O)