Security Basics mailing list archives

Re: External Network / Firewall Setup.


From: Florian Rommel <frommel () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 08 Sep 2005 00:52:58 +0300

Hi,
I think what was meant with single point of failure was that the failure point was not in control (county management) ....

Please correct me if i am wrong.

Now about your setup.. it might be a bit overkill but actually not too badly.. at least you got it well from a security point... I am jut wondering, if you have only a mailserver in the DMZ, why not install a hostbased IDS on it (snort locally) and have it log to the other snort machine. That would also help in making the analysis easier since you have everything on one machine. Unless both of them log to the same analysis machine. Word of the wise, configure your snort well, especially snort(1) because the number of false positives you will receive is astronomical. A good advise that I got in one of the Symantec IDS trainings was: " and IDS/IPS system is an ongoing thing, if you dont have the time to check it as much as it needs, dont use it". We have deployed a few snort based IDS systems and once they are configured well a daily check or 2 for small companies is actually enough, it just has to be consistently checked.

Otherwise I like the setup, you have no redundancy so if a hub fails you loose connection and I totaly agree with what Tim wrote about the mail server just being a relay etc. Should be a quite neat small setup when done. about the PIX, if you can afford it, go for it. Otherwise you can use a OBSD box for that which IMHO is a very very nice granular first firewall because of the small HW requirements and the small memory footprint.


well my 2 cents

//Florian

http://www.2blocksaway.com





Tim.BUTTON () Dest gov au wrote:

but I'm wary of a single point of failure<<<<

I'm not sure what you're referring to about a single point of failure.
In the network design you've provided, there is no apparent
redundancy......so each of the devices is a single point of failure.  To
avoid that, you'll need multiple devices in HA, which may well be
overkill for what you need.

Something I'm still unsure about is internal clients connecting to
the mailserver in the DMZ - how much of a security issue is this?

Should I use the DMZ mailserver simply as a relay for an internal
mailserver?<<<

IMHO, better to use your box in the DMZ as a relay only. You can run
postfix/sendmail/whatever and use it to do some granular filtering. If
you're keen enough, install some different virus scanner/anti-spam
software on there, and get your box to pass the mail to that before
allowing anything inbound. The other advantage of doing this is that it
allows you to kill anything you don't want at the border. Finally, it
means that if your internal server blows up or something, you'll still
queue inbound mail....which is good.

If you get super keen, you can set it up to run iptables and tcpwrappers
and tie it down.

My 2 bobs worth


-----Original Message-----
From: lists () ninjafriendly com [mailto:lists () ninjafriendly com] Sent: Monday, 5 September 2005 21:45
To: security-basics () securityfocus com
Subject: External Network / Firewall Setup.

Hi all,

Background: We're a .sch.uk with a currently county-managed firewall and
webmail
provision.  We have a 2mb symmettric DSL connection with approx 30% use
at any
one time.  Due to service and reliability issues with the county-managed
solution we are looking to run our own mailserver, accessible from the
internet.  On balance, maintaining our own firewall setup is less hassle
than
keeping what we currently have.

I'm currently in the process of working out the firewall requirements,
what I
have so far is this:

Internet
|
Router
|
Firewall(1)
|
HUB---Snort(1)
| |___Mailserver
|
Firewall(2)
|
HUB---Snort(2)
|
|
LAN

I suspect this setup may be overkill for the amount of traffic we
receive, but
I'm wary of a single point of failure.  Hardware isn't a problem.

Further info: The mailserver will be running Horde.  I'm hoping to
convince
management to use a PIX or similar for the first firewall and then
something
*nix based for the second, otherwise it will be two *nix boxes (IPcop
and
something BSD based).

Something I'm still unsure about is internal clients connecting to the
mailserver in the DMZ - how much of a security issue is this?  Should I
use the
DMZ mailserver simply as a relay for an internal mailserver?

Would anyone mind looking this over and telling me if I've screwed up /
overlooked something?

Thanks

Pete


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