Vulnerability Development mailing list archives

Re: Windows Vista winsat.exe Integer Overflow


From: Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu
Date: Fri, 04 Apr 2008 12:22:35 -0400

On Thu, 03 Apr 2008 10:58:14 PDT, "Thor (Hammer of God)" said:
Hey Valdis -

So, if you have someone who is going to run as administrator anyway,
download the untrusted .exe, execute it, and then confirm the
execution of the program without concern for what happens, we can't
really fault the OS for that at this point in the game.

I wasn't faulting the OS - I was pointing out it's still a viable
attack vector, despite the OS's best efforts to stop it.

I know you weren't specifically faulting the OS for this -- it's just
that when I see posts that combine the "non-issue of the day" with a
requirement of "this is bad because if I can get the user to run
arbitrary code as administrator first, then I use that code to exploit
his vulnerability" coupled with "and this is easy because it's trivial
to get people to run malicious code and we all know they all just click
through all warnings" that it just gets to be too much.

I'm aware that you didn't say all of the above, but it's what the net
result of the thread became.

From the *prevention* side of the fence, it's true - once you get the user
to run untrusted code as administrator, the box is pwned good and thoroughly.
And since there's a wide variety of things that can happen, "nuke it from
orbit and re-install, it's the only way to be sure" is the operative phrase.

The number of *different* things that can be done once you get an initial
foothold of executing code is more probably interesting to those of us who
do computer forensics, where the exact mechanism *is* relevant to figuring
out what happened, and (possibly) how to prevent it from happening again.

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