Vulnerability Development mailing list archives

Re: New DoS attack


From: huuskone () CC HELSINKI FI (Taneli Huuskonen)
Date: Tue, 20 Jun 2000 10:13:48 +0300


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Dave Booth <dave.booth () MEDTRONIC COM> wrote:

[...]
Game client makes tcp connection to server and requests to join the
game.
Server responds (as part of the same tcp session) with a unique token,
remembers it and the clients IP then signs off.
Client initiates normal UDP game connection including the token in
every datagram.
Server silently ignores all incoming datagrams where there isnt a valid
token that matches up with the IP address the datagram claims to come
from.

This thread was originally about the use of game servers as traffic
amplifiers for smurf-type DoS attacks.  The problem is that a game
server can be tricked into sending relatively large amounts of data in
response to a blindly spoofed request to join the game, thereby flooding
the spoofed address.

It seems to me that your suggested protocol would indeed solve the
problem, but I think it's overkill.  The same result is achieved by
having the server reply to the initial contact attempt with a packet
containing essentially nothing but the token.  After that, continue like
you propose.  Much simpler and cleaner, IMHO.

Taneli Huuskonen

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