Vulnerability Development mailing list archives

Re: A little guidance...


From: sec () ORGONE NEGATION NET (Jason Storm)
Date: Wed, 31 May 2000 19:32:58 -0700


if you have already alerted the vendor, post the attack.

probable case scenario:
vendor scoffs and says "this isnt our problem".

vendor2 says "whoa.. this works on our software as well, lets make it
not work."

vendors3 4 and 5 impliment vendor 2's fix.

vendor1 goes out of business and you get to mock them.

a lot.

-jason storm

On Wed, 31 May 2000, Bill Pennington wrote:

Let me clear a few things up since after reading my original message
again I seemed to be much to vague.

The issue I have uncovered is directly related to implementation, not a
flaw in software (as far as I can tell). The site in question does pass
all CC#s over SSL, no CC#s are passed in clear text. There are things
passed in clear text that enable you to "high jack" a web page that
displays the CC#. It is basically substituting strings in a URL. Nothing
earth shattering to most of us I would think. Possibly helpful to clue
less people, I dunno.

Thanks for all your comments/suggestions so far!


John Kinsella wrote:

Unfortunately the clueless will never figure it out until you shove it
in their face...some of the really sharp guys out there may have figured it
out as well.  Alot of people in the middle who haven't thought of it yet
or don't have the time to beat on all the doors themselves may thank you
for quite a while...

Where I think it's most important to disclose stuff like this is
because it may get somebody else's mind thinking, and allow a
discovery of either the same type of problem in another product, or
maybe something on a complete different tangent altogether.  I hope it's
safe to say that most of us have our methods for dealing with "too much"
information, so give us what ya got. :)

John

On Tue, May 30, 2000 at 01:09:25PM -0700, Bill Pennington wrote:
I have uncovered a flaw in a particular web site that allows you to
steal CC#s of unsuspecting victims. In order to exploit this you must be
able to sniff traffic that is going between the users machine and the
web site in question.

My question is, should I even bother putting this out? I researched some
archives and while I found a number of e-commerce shopping cart
vulnerabilities, none mentioned this particular method. I have contacted
the site in question but they seem to be clueless. ("All CC#s are over
SSL so we are safe!!" argg!) So is the fact you need a sniffer (or a
proxy server would work as well I guess, hmmmm) to exploit this make it
not "worthy"? It seems more and more devices are sniffing/capturing
network traffic these day (IDS, proxies, bad guys...) so it seems to be
a legitimate concern to me.

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