Snort mailing list archives

Re: [Emerging-Sigs] Signatures for Clients POSTing to SEO/NEOsploit Exploit Kits - Round 2


From: Will Metcalf <william.metcalf () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 10 Aug 2010 17:17:38 -0500

Eoin,

To be completely honest other than looking at a modification to the
behavior of byte_test option parsing I haven't looked at the snort
source code in a very long time.  This only the observed behavior of
content/modifier interaction that I have seen.  Hopefully somebody
from SF will respond.

Regards,

Will

On Tue, Aug 10, 2010 at 4:24 PM, Eoin Miller
<eoin.miller () trojanedbinaries com> wrote:
 On 8/10/2010 8:49 PM, Will Metcalf wrote:

ehhh be careful... this only works for http_uri and http_client_body
all other http_* modifiers using distance/within fails silently....
always... at least in my testing. Which makes me wonder why snort
doesn't reject those rules during parsing as they will never match.
Joel?  Also did you test these because as of 2.8.5.3 (yes I know, I
know) this would only work if you did....

content:"id="; http_client_body; content:"%26jp"; distance:32;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:5600099; rev:2;)

leaving off the second http_client_body modifier. Otherwise it appears
the behavior is to always in this case distance would start from the
beginning of the normalized buffer i.e. behaves like offset.  The same
trick works for http_uri but if the uri has to be decoded/normalized
in anyway it will always fail.

This is really annoying to me btw.  if you have a normalized buffer
why as a rule writer you should be able to di something like what Eoin
is trying to do.  For things where within/distance don't really make
much of a difference I can understand read uricontent, but for things
like http headers etc where you fingerprint things like a unique
user-agent using within/distance and can avoid pcre why not allow this
instead of assuming that the user "really meant" dept/offset.

just my 0.02

Regards,

Will

Will,

Thank you for this information. This literally just bit me in the rear, but
it appears to have been in a slightly different way? What is really weird
though is only one of the signatures is triggering and the other isn't on
the same traffic. In trying to troubleshoot this, I've rewritten the sigs to
even be specifying in content matches in for the %26 expressed in hex as |25
32 36| but that doesn't seem to matter either. Check this out:

alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"DRIVEBY SEO
Exploit Kit - request for Java exploit"; flow:established,to_server;
content:"POST"; http_method; content:"id="; http_client_body; content:"|25
32 36|j"; distance:32; http_client_body; classtype:bad-unknown; sid:5600100;
rev:2;)
alert tcp $HOME_NET any -> $EXTERNAL_NET $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"EID DRIVEBY SEO
Exploit Kit - request for Java and PDF exploits";
flow:established,to_server; content:"POST"; http_method; content:"id=";
http_client_body; content:"|25 32 36|jp"; distance:32; http_client_body;
classtype:bad-unknown; sid:5600101; rev:2;)

When compared against the following POST:

POST
/earth-expandable-substrate-pack-p-1903.html?action=add_product&currency=USD&osCsid=uhlf66l9csn4gkpvj9kq016ht2
HTTP/1.1
Accept: image/gif, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, image/pjpeg,
application/x-ms-application, application/x-ms-xbap,
application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml,
application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword,
application/x-shockwave-flash, */*
Referer:
http://www.mopsdirect.us/earth-expandable-substrate-pack-p-1903.html?currency=USD
Accept-Language: en-us
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0;
.NET CLR 1.1.4322; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR
3.5.30729; InfoPath.2)
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Host: www.mopsdirect.us
Content-Length: 26
Connection: Keep-Alive
Cache-Control: no-cache
Cookie: osCsid=uhlf66l9csn4gkpvj9kq016ht2

products_id=1903&x=45&y=13


Only the first of those two signatures fires on this. Why? Damned if I know.
There isn't even 32 bytes of data after the "id=" before you get to the end
of the http_client_body buffer and the hex string "|25 32 36|j" doesn't
exist anywhere in the entire packet, normalized or otherwise (unless I am
blind).

-- Eoin






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