Secure Coding mailing list archives

RE: Secured Coding


From: "David Crocker" <dcrocker () eschertech com>
Date: Mon, 15 Nov 2004 03:32:50 +0000

George (Greenarrow) wrote:

I truly believe this as no matter how secured we make our programs there 
will always be someone to figure how to break it.<<

That may be so; but the simple fact is, most of the problem software we have
today is nothing like bulletproof.

When I first learned programming (about 30 years ago), I took it as axiomatic
that a program should be robust with respect to *all possible* external inputs.
Unfortunately, most developers don't seem to care about this - they are
satisfied as soon as the program behaves correctly with respect to *valid*
inputs. So the first thing to is to educate developers into understanding that a
program that is not robust with respect to all inputs is not a finished program.

Second, tools for mathematically specifying and verifying programs (<plug> -
such as our own - </plug>) should be used more widely. Even if you have the goal
of making a program robust, it is easy to make mistakes. Recently I wrote a
program which, as its input mechanism, parsed simple English sentences. I was
aiming to make the program robust; but I missed a way in which a sentence could
be malformed so as to cause unexpected results. I would never have thought of
testing for that sentence pattern (maybe random testing would have found it);
but I was using automated formal verification, and the tool identified that
pattern as a problem. It is relatively simple to use formal semantics to specify
"for all possible inputs X, property Y is true". By using such semantics coupled
with tools and methods to verify them, large classes of attacks (e.g. buffer
overflows, SQL injection etc.) can be completely eliminated.

Thirdly, developers need to be aware of basic concepts of security and how to
design architectures to facilitate security. Furthermore, even when using formal
tools, developers need to know what are the important security properties. For
example, some phishing attacks used a vulnerability in some browsers that meant
it was possible to make a browser visit one site while displaying another in the
address bar. Such a problem is easy to guard against using tool-supported formal
techniques - but someone has to identify the requirement (i.e. address bar
always displays the address of the current page) in the first place. I think
that a security module should be a compulsory part of all programming and
computer science degree courses.

Taken together, these changes would result in software that would resist the
vast majority of attacks. It may not always be possible to make software
bulletproof, but that is not an excuse for the appalling insecurity of much of
today's software.

David Crocker, Escher Technologies Ltd.
Consultancy, contracting and tools for dependable software development
www.eschertech.com




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