Secure Coding mailing list archives

RE: Hypothetical design question


From: ljknews <ljknews () mac com>
Date: Tue, 03 Feb 2004 15:55:33 +0000

At 8:53 PM -0600 2/1/04, Alun Jones wrote:
-----Original Message-----
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
[mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of ljknews
Sent: Saturday, January 31, 2004 12:43 PM

Antivirus scanners typically work by matching against 
patterns of known
viruses.  For VMS that is the null set.

Hope you don't mind me saying this, but that's essentially a null argument.

All software sucks, that's a given.  All software has bugs, all software has
security flaws, often the biggest of which is that all software is (at some
point) used, configured and controlled by humans.

Certainly all software has defects, but whether that can be exploited
by sociopaths can vary.

Unless you're going to point to specific _technical_ features of VMS (and
I'm glad that you have) that prevent the spread of viruses, the argument
that the system currently has no viruses is nothing better than a security
by obscurity argument.

1. VMS does _nothing_ automatically on receipt of email.

2. VMS users in practice do not typically run with system management
   privileges.

3. Programming practices by VMS Development and the VMS Calling Standard
   mitigate against buffer overflows and similar exploits in sensitive code.

4. Successive releases of VMS do not involve wholesale replacement (vs.
   refinement) of significant numbers of modules.  I have heard an estimate
   that 30% of one release of Windows NT was totally replaced for one release.
   Starting from scratch rather than modifying old code is a monumental effort
   and no development organization can support to much of that at a time.

Certainly VMS is software, and thus not perfect.  VMS Development has
announced to small groups certain security improvements they are planning
for VMS 8.2, but these are to defend against potential exploits that have
not been reported on VMS.  The great mass of security-related changes in
VMS 6.0 were in response to defects discovered only in white-box testing.


[Ed. I think that we've taken this thread about as far (or farther :-) than it
should go.  Folks, let's please either bring this back to secure application
development practices, or let's let the thread die.  Thanks.  KRvW]






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