Penetration Testing mailing list archives
Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows
From: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor () hammerofgod com>
Date: Thu, 22 Sep 2005 00:54:20 -0700
I saw this one first, so I go top-down (It's getting late for me, so I'll get right to it.) First off-- don't just Google for it and reference a single article with out-of-context "cut and paste" elements from: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/itsolutions/cits/mo/smf/smfsecad.mspx You quote: "advisable to make IPsec-based authentication a part of the authentication process" The actual text reads: "As mentioned earlier, L2TP relies on other protocols for its security. L2TP authentication is best for the exchange of packets between the LAC and the LNS. Therefore, it is advisable to make IPSec-based authentication a part of L2TP." Other quotes are similar.. My original post was to content regarding actual authentication protocol mechanisms like LM, NTLM, NTLMv2 and Kerberos. The article you reference does indeed use the phrase "IPSec Authentication," but as any who reads itwill see, the term is used to describe the higher level protocol deployment; a higher
level protocol that has, as I said before, 3 authentication mechanisms available to establish a connection. Here's the article that should be referenced: http://www.microsoft.com/technet/prodtechnol/windowsserver2003/library/ServerHelp/be7540ff-2a1d-47b4-8e7f-501ec692ad11.mspx The relevant text being: <meat> Overview of authentication methods: For authentication, IPSec allows you to use the Kerberos V5 protocol, certificate-based authentication, or preshared key authentication. </meat> Which is what I said the first time.And not to be blunt, but your previous post describing the IPSec channel setup of "system" and "client" is just wrong... the above link has many other references that will help you understand how IPSec Policies and component filters and actions work. The "2 parts" are the default negotiation, and the subsequent filter definitions. Both of which still require a PSK, Kerberos auth, or cert to be established.
The data is all right there if you want to check it out-- I don't see any reason to argue about it, and it's all right there in the documentation... If you want to discuss this off-list, (in a constructive way) I'm happy to do so, but I think we're done on the list... (except for my last response to the first message- then I'm hitting the sack ;)
t----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Wright" <cwright () bdosyd com au>
To: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor () hammerofgod com>; <pand0ra.usa () gmail com>; <pen-test () securityfocus com> Sent: Thursday, September 22, 2005 12:01 AM Subject: RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows PPPS To drop a quote from Technet (Microsoft Corporation) "IPsec based Authentication and integrity" and "Initial security proposals involve using IPsec-based authentication" "advisable to make IPsec-based authentication a part of the authentication process" "IPsec-based authentication is recommended" To quote the "rmt-pi" working party from the IETF "provided using IPsec-based authentication at the network layer" "I'd have to say that there is no such thing..." - Please inform MSFT - they seem to think there is Craig -----Original Message----- From: Thor (Hammer of God) [mailto:thor () hammerofgod com] Sent: 22 September 2005 3:46 To: Craig Wright; pand0ra.usa () gmail com; pen-test () securityfocus com Subject: Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Well, that's an issue with the client, not NTLMv2. NTLMv2 is tight. LM sucks- that's obvious (and it was IBM, not MS that gave us that one.) And yes, you can use precomputed tables against NTLM hashes, but not against NTLMv2... The NTLM hash is keyed off of the password, but NTLMv2 hashes up the password with the user's domain/user data when generating the key... You can't precompile that data into a rainbow, you know? Regarding the "IPsec based auth" reference (here I go again), I'd have to say that there is no such thing... IPSec negotiation in Windows can be based on one of three mechanisms: A pre-shared key, Kerberos, or a cert-- it is not an authentication protocol in itself... (the cert being the strongest IMO). t ----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Wright" <cwright () bdosyd com au> To: "Thor (Hammer of God)" <thor () hammerofgod com>; <pand0ra.usa () gmail com>; <pen-test () securityfocus com> Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 10:05 PM Subject: RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Further to the last post There are a number of issues with NTLMv2 and legacy applications such as Windows RAS that cause lower levels of authentication I still say that Kerberos or IPsec based auth is the best policy in windows. LanMan, NTLMv1 or V2 are vulnerable. Precomputed tables may have been uncommon 12 months ago - but that was then and this is now. Cain & Abel will use sorted Rainbow Tables for Cryptanalysis attacks Craig -----Original Message----- From: Thor (Hammer of God) [mailto:thor () hammerofgod com] Sent: 22 September 2005 12:00 To: Craig Wright; pand0ra.usa () gmail com; pen-test () securityfocus com Subject: Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows ----- Original Message ----- From: "Craig Wright" <cwright () bdosyd com au> To: <pand0ra.usa () gmail com>; <pen-test () securityfocus com> Sent: Wednesday, September 21, 2005 12:32 PM Subject: RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows
Even NTLMv2 will break the hashing into chunks which are able to be individually broken down.
I'm not sure what you mean... NTLMv2 uses a single 128bit key for the hash, challenge and response... Or are you referring to the NTLM2 session response key (56+56+16)? If so, that is not the same thing as NTLMv2... Can you elaborate please ? t ------------------------------------------------------------------------------Audit your website security with Acunetix Web Vulnerability Scanner: Hackers are concentrating their efforts on attacking applications on your website. Up to 75% of cyber attacks are launched on shopping carts, forms, login pages, dynamic content etc. Firewalls, SSL and locked-down servers are futile against web application hacking. Check your website for vulnerabilities to SQL injection, Cross site scripting and other web attacks before hackers do! Download Trial at:
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Current thread:
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows, (continued)
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Thor (Hammer of God) (Sep 22)
- RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Craig Wright (Sep 22)
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Thor (Hammer of God) (Sep 22)
- RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Craig Wright (Sep 22)
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Thor (Hammer of God) (Sep 22)
- RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Craig Wright (Sep 22)
- RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Craig Wright (Sep 22)
- RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Craig Wright (Sep 22)
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Thor (Hammer of God) (Sep 22)
- RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Craig Wright (Sep 22)
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Thor (Hammer of God) (Sep 22)
- RE: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Craig Wright (Sep 22)
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows philippe . nospam . oechslin (Sep 23)
- Re: Passwords with Lan Manager (LM) under Windows Susan Bradley, CPA aka Ebitz - SBS Rocks [MVP] (Sep 24)