oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz
From: Alex Gaynor <alex.gaynor () gmail com>
Date: Mon, 24 Jun 2019 19:15:20 -0400
I figured it'd be useful to summarize the themes I think I'm hearing: - Greater automation around requesting CVEs so that when there really are a lot of vulnerabilities they can be requested easily and have most of the details filled in by automatic systems like syzbot of ClusterFuzz. - Better automation around assessing exploitability -- I confess this one sounds very hard to me, at least without requiring more user involvement than ASAN requires right now. This seems like a very cool area for academic research though! - Not having sooooo many vulnerabilities. While there's some dispute over just what % of the bugs that OSS-Fuzz and syzbot turn up are exploitable, there's no doubt that they find a _lot_ of them. Even if only 20% of OSS-Fuzz reports were truly exploitable vulnerabilities, that'd still be
600 of them. We can't produce this many vulnerabilities and then try to
clean up afterwards by finding them with fuzzing -- at some point the number of vulnerabilities simply overwhelms us. Tactics for reducing vulnerabilities in the first instance, like memory safe languages, are an important part of making this problem tractable. Do folks feel like there were important themes that this misses? All of these seem actionable, in their own way, which I like. Alex On Mon, Jun 24, 2019 at 3:32 PM Simon McVittie <smcv () debian org> wrote:
On Mon, 24 Jun 2019 at 13:00:28 -0400, David A. Wheeler wrote:In particular, many organizations have a rapid upgrade process if some software version has a CVE, and a slow process otherwise. (There are things that need doing besides upgrading software.) If a particular version of software has a serious vulnerability, itneeds at least oneof the most serious vulnerabilities assigned a CVE so that people willupgradeit more rapidly.I think you might have also been implying this, but just to say it explicitly: if a particular version of software has lots of fixed bugs, but they are not exploitable vulnerabilities in practice, then it would be counterproductive to try to fast-track upgrades (trick people into using their rapid upgrade process) by assigning CVE IDs to those bugs. Fast-tracking upgrades of packages with CVE fixes is only going to happen as long as it's still a rational strategy for balancing vulnerability exposure against the risk of regressions. If lots of CVE IDs get assigned to issues that aren't exploitable in the real world, then that will teach consumers of software that they can safely ignore "most" CVEs, which will tend to result in some issues that *are* exploitable being missed and not fixed on deployed systems. Everyone loses (except attackers). This is a particularly interesting trade-off for denial-of-service vulnerabilities, because regressions caused by flawed fixes for vulnerabilities often cause denial of service. (This is often a crash, but not necessarily - addressing local DoS vulnerability CVE-2014-3637 in dbus led to some machines not booting reliably, denying service to rather more people than the original vulnerability.) In the worst case, a flawed fix for a vulnerability might contain a regression that is a more serious vulnerability. smcv
-- All that is necessary for evil to succeed is for good people to do nothing.
Current thread:
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz, (continued)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Alexander Potapenko (Jun 17)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Jakub Wilk (Jun 23)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Marcus Meissner (Jun 17)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Dmitry Vyukov (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Bob Friesenhahn (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Stuart D. Gathman (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Bob Friesenhahn (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Matthew Fernandez (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz David A. Wheeler (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Simon McVittie (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Alex Gaynor (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Seth Arnold (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Bob Friesenhahn (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Alex Gaynor (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Alexander Potapenko (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Matthew Fernandez (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Jeff Law (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Pascal Cuoq (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Jeff Law (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Dmitry Vyukov (Jun 24)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Bob Friesenhahn (Jun 25)
- Re: Thousands of vulnerabilities, almost no CVEs: OSS-Fuzz Jeffrey Walton (Jun 25)