oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961)
From: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry () piermont com>
Date: Wed, 17 Oct 2018 09:21:54 -0400
On Wed, 17 Oct 2018 02:09:28 -0400 Rich Felker <dalias () libc org> wrote:
I keep wondering if there isn't a way to fully remove the dangerous bits from a postscript interpreter so it can _only_ be used to view the document and literally has no file system access compiled in at all, so there's no way to touch the fs etc. regardless of what flags the interpreter is invoked with. (I, too, find removing the ability to look at historical postscript documents a bit more draconian than I like.)I've discussed it with upstream, it's a hard no because they feel it would make ghostscript non-conforming (i.e. non-conforming with the Adobe PostScript Language Reference Manual) We probably have similar thoughts on this, but that is the final word from upstream.They wouldn't even support a compilation mode where if you #define the right thing those syscalls are cut out? I don't care much about upstream's desires on this if they oppose that. I'd be happy to have patches that simply cut out the dangerous syscalls entirely. It's open source, that should be feasible.This. It's utterly ridiculous that the interpreter even has bindings for accessing the filesystem and such. But I wonder if some of its library routines (e.g. font loading) are implemented in Postscript, using these bindings, rather than being implemented in C outside of the language interpreter. If so it might be harder to extricate. But I still think it's worthwhile to try. Once there are patches I would expect all reasonable distros to start shipping with them, and if upstream tries to make it hard, I would expect one of the big distros to just fork and abandon upstream.
Does anyone other than Tavis know their way around the inside of the codebase? Perhaps we can collaborate on patches. Perry -- Perry E. Metzger perry () piermont com
Current thread:
- ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Tavis Ormandy (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Leonid Isaev (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Tavis Ormandy (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Bob Friesenhahn (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Perry E. Metzger (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Tavis Ormandy (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Alex Gaynor (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Doran Moppert (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Perry E. Metzger (Oct 10)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Rich Felker (Oct 16)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Perry E. Metzger (Oct 17)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Rich Felker (Oct 17)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Tavis Ormandy (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Leonid Isaev (Oct 09)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Hanno Böck (Oct 10)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Eddie Chapman (Oct 10)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Hanno Böck (Oct 10)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Emilio Pozuelo Monfort (Oct 11)
- Re: ghostscript: bypassing executeonly to escape -dSAFER sandbox (CVE-2018-17961) Brandon Perry (Oct 10)