oss-sec mailing list archives
Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros?
From: Cliff Perry <cperry () redhat com>
Date: Mon, 25 Sep 2017 14:52:13 +0100
On 23/09/17 12:44, Hanno Böck wrote:
Hi, A few days have passed since the optionsbleed disclosure. Some interesting things have surfaced, e.g. the fact that it was apparently discovered already in 2014, but nobody noticed it was a security bug. But I'd like to discuss something else: I had informed the distros mailing list one week earlier about the upcoming disclosure with a bug description and links to the already available patch. My understanding is that the purpose of the distros list is that updates can be prepared so after a disclosure the time between "vuln is known" and "patch is available" is short. However from all I can see this largely didn't happen. Debian+Ubuntu took more than a day after disclosure to fix. According to the Debian bug tracker the bug got only opened after the public disclosure[2]. I see no sign that any work on a fix began before the disclosure. If I can trust Red Hat's CVE tracker [3] there still are no fixed packages available. Also I haven't found any info about updated opensuse packages. The only distro I'm aware of that prepared packages and pushed them right after disclosure is Gentoo. All of this makes me wonder if the distros list serves its purpose. I'd be curious to hear: a) if any people felt that pre-disclosure of optionsbleed was helpful to them and in which way (after all - even if it only helps minor distros and major distros ignore it it may still be a good thing). b) if people think that they'd usually prepare a fixed package, however they didn't consider optionsbleed important enough. (Naturally I probably have a bias seeing my findings as more important as other people, but I could live with that.) c) other things? [1] https://arxiv.org/pdf/1405.2330.pdf https://blog.fuzzing-project.org/61-How-Optionsbleed-wasnt-found-in-2014.html [2] https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=876109 [3] https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2017-9798
Hi Hanno, The detail of your report was good quality and I'm sure appreciated by everyone who needed to review it. I know that for Red Hat the pre-disclosure was useful. During analysis, like SUSE, we rated it as having a security impact of Moderate (https://access.redhat.com/security/updates/classification); and not highly impacting that required expedited preparation of packages for the embargo date. Additional information is contained within the bugzilla linked off our CVE page (https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1490344). We look forward to working with you again in the future. Regards, Cliff -- Senior Engineering Manager Red Hat Product Security
Current thread:
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros?, (continued)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Levente Polyak (Sep 23)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Anthony Liguori (Sep 23)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Simon McVittie (Sep 23)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Marc Deslauriers (Sep 23)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Kurt H Maier (Sep 23)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Till Dörges (Sep 23)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Marcus Meissner (Sep 23)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Ludovic Courtès (Sep 24)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Igor Seletskiy (Sep 24)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? John Haxby (Sep 25)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Cliff Perry (Sep 25)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Leo Famulari (Sep 25)
- Re: Why send bugs embargoed to distros? Levente Polyak (Sep 23)