oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: CVE request for unchecked size argument in malloc() in CHICKEN Scheme


From: Peter Bex <peter () more-magic net>
Date: Thu, 16 Mar 2017 17:34:21 +0100

On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 01:17:13PM +0100, Peter Korsgaard wrote:
"Peter" == Peter Bex <peter () more-magic net> writes:

 > On Thu, Mar 16, 2017 at 10:31:17AM +0100, Adam Maris wrote:
 >> Hi Peter,
 >> 
 >> oss-security mailing is no longer a place for requesting CVEs. Please,
 >> request CVE from MITRE via https://cveform.mitre.org/ or also possibly
 >> from DWF project via http://iwantacve.org/

 > Oh yeah, I forgot about that.  I've filled out the form, and I hope I've
 > done this correctly.

Please don't forget to forward the form details to this list once a CVE
has been assigned. Thanks.

This was assigned CVE-2017-6949.  The form details were in my original
mail, but I'll include them here again, though I must say fiddling around
with e-mail to forward it is much much more inconvenient than how it used
to work:

[Suggested description]
An issue was discovered in CHICKEN Scheme through 4.12.0.
When using a nonstandard CHICKEN-specific extension to allocate an
SRFI-4 vector in unmanaged memory, the vector size would be used in
unsanitised form as an argument to malloc(). With an unexpected size,
the impact may have been a segfault or buffer overflow.

------------------------------------------

[Vulnerability Type]
Buffer Overflow

------------------------------------------

[Affected Product Code Base]
Affected: All versions up to and including 4.12.0.  No fixed versions released yet

------------------------------------------

[Affected Component]
All SRFI-4 vector constructor functions in CHICKEN Scheme

------------------------------------------

[Attack Type]
Context-dependent

------------------------------------------

[Impact Code execution]
true

------------------------------------------

[Impact Denial of Service]
true

------------------------------------------

[Attack Vectors]
When using a nonstandard CHICKEN-specific extension to allocate a
SRFI-4 vector in unmanaged memory, the vector size would be used in
unsanitised form as argument to malloc().

------------------------------------------

[Reference]
http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/chicken-announce/2017-03/msg00000.html

------------------------------------------

[Has vendor confirmed or acknowledged the vulnerability?]
true

------------------------------------------

[Discoverer]
Lemonboy

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