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Re: Healing the bash fork


From: Michal Zalewski <lcamtuf () coredump cx>
Date: Tue, 30 Sep 2014 07:27:48 -0700

Florian's prefix/suffix patch is not going to protect against the setuid/setgid exploit that I reported to this list 
last week.

I discuss the setuid/setgid vulnerability at the following site, including demonstrating how Florian's prefix/suffix 
patch provides no protection:

http://technicalprose.blogspot.co.uk/2014/09/shellshock-bug-third-vulnerability.html

You do realize that your setuid program is patently unsafe, right? Say:

$ echo -e '#!/bin/sh\necho pwn3d' >date;chmod 755 date;PATH=.:$PWD
./setuid_program
pwn3d

/mz


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