oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: [CVE Requests] rsync and librsync collisions


From: Loganaden Velvindron <loganaden () gmail com>
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2014 09:06:52 +0400

On Sep 9, 2014 7:47 AM, "Murray McAllister" <mmcallis () redhat com> wrote:

Good morning,

The below still require a CVE or two (unless MITRE disagrees).


Have the details been made public yet ?
Cheers,

--
Murray McAllister / Red Hat Product Security


On 08/05/2014 04:03 PM, Michael Samuel wrote:

Hi,

I think there should be CVEs assigned for this:

rsync: MD5 collision DoS attack or limited file corruption
librsync: MD4 collision file corruption

Note: librsync is not the same code, protocol or maintainer as rsync.

The librsync attack is far easier to perform, since there's no
whole-file checksum and it will simply copy the first instance of a
collision into any place where the second collision is.

The rdiff utility that ships with librsync truncates hashes to 8
bytes, allowing a very fast and efficient birthday attack - so even if
MD4 was replaced attacks would still be possible while the hash is
truncted.  This also affects duplicity - they both use
RS_DEFAULT_STRONG_LEN - so the _librsyncmodule that ships with
duplicity will need recompiling after the fix ships.

Previous posting for context:
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2014/07/28/1

Regards,
   Michael



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