oss-sec mailing list archives

Re: Question regarding CVE applicability of missing HttpOnly flag


From: "Vincent Danen" <vdanen () redhat com>
Date: Fri, 27 Jun 2014 10:35:33 -0600

On 06/26/2014, at 10:00 AM, Kurt Seifried wrote:

On 26/06/14 05:45 AM, Jamie Strandboge wrote:
Based on this email and the one this is in response to, I find this
comment unclear. Is MITRE saying that:

a) lack of implementing SELinux, AppArmor, virus scanner, firewall,
<insert hardening software here> does not justify a CVE because of
the complexity? b) lack of implementing SELinux, AppArmor, virus
scanner, firewall, <insert hardening software here> does not
justify a CVE and also cannot be considered an implementation error
because of the complexity? c) implementing SELinux, AppArmor, virus
scanner, firewall, and/or <insert hardening software here> is not
worth it because the added complexity intrinsically makes the
system less secure? d) something else?

Thanks

So one comment on this, replace the above with "DAC"
(http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Discretionary_access_control) and I bet
we'd hand it a CVE =).

Security lines move, I would expect most modern system of any type
(Windows, Linux, router, maybe not my bathroom scale that talks
wifi... yet) to have some sort of firewall enabled by default and not
simply leave everything exposed to the world. So in that case not
having a fire enabled by default would definitely violate the
principle of least surprise and maybe even qualify for a CVE.

Wait.  You're saying that not having a firewall enabled by default qualifies for a CVE?  I mean, firewalls are pretty 
common sense and should definitely be used/available/whatever but to say that an operating system or device doesn't 
have a firewall enabled by default should have a CVE assigned seems... excessive, doesn't it?

How is not having a firewall enabled by default a _vulnerability_?  If we look at it this way, it's a good thing CVEs 
go past 9999 per year because we need to change everything we used to call "hardening" to be a vulnerability, do we not?


-- 
Vincent Danen / Red Hat Product Security

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