Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)

[sronan () ronan-online com]

I suppose but that also means they need to go back and figure out which prefixes to allow, since historically hasn’t 
been tracked.

Also, how does the man in the middle since most calls don’t go from originating carrier to terminating carrier, know if 
the originator did their job?

> On Oct 4, 2022, at 4:50 PM, Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
>
> 
>
>
> On 10/4/22 1:40 PM, sronan () ronan-online com wrote:
> > Except the pstn DB isn’t distributed like DNS is.
>
> Yes, I had forgot about "dip" in that sense. But an originating provider doesn't need to do a dip to know that the 
> calling number routes to itself. I've been talking about the calling provider not the called provider all along.
>
> Mike
>
> > > On Oct 4, 2022, at 2:40 PM, Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> > >
> > > 
> > >
> > >
> > > On 10/4/22 11:21 AM, Shane Ronan wrote:
> > > > Except the cost to do the data dips to determine the authorization isn't "free".
> > > Since every http request in the universe requires a "database dip" and they are probably a billion times more 
> > > common, that doesn't seem like a very compelling concern.
> > >
> > > Mike
> > >
> > >
> > >
> > > > On Tue, Oct 4, 2022 at 2:18 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> > > > > On 10/4/22 6:07 AM, Mike Hammett wrote:
> > > > > > I think the point the other Mike was trying to make was that if everyone policed their customers, this wouldn't 
> > > > > > be a problem. Since some don't, something else needed to be tried.
> > > > > Exactly. And that doesn't require an elaborate PKI. Who is allowed to use what telephone numbers is an 
> > > > > administrative issue for the ingress provider to police. It's the equivalent to gmail not allowing me to spoof 
> > > > > whatever email address I want. The FCC could have required that ages ago.
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > >
> > > > > Mike
> > > > >
> > > > > > -----
> > > > > > Mike Hammett
> > > > > > Intelligent Computing Solutions
> > > > > > http://www.ics-il.com
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Midwest-IX
> > > > > > http://www.midwest-ix.com
> > > > > >
> > > > > > From: "Shane Ronan" <shane () ronan-online com>
> > > > > > To: "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com>
> > > > > > Cc: nanog () nanog org
> > > > > > Sent: Monday, October 3, 2022 9:54:07 PM
> > > > > > Subject: Re: FCC chairwoman: Fines alone aren't enough (Robocalls)
> > > > > >
> > > > > > The issue isn't which 'prefixes' I accept from my customers, but which 'prefixes' I accept from the people I 
> > > > > > peer with, because it's entirely dynamic and without a doing a database dip on EVERY call, I have to assume that 
> > > > > > my peer or my peers customer or my peers peer is doing the right thing.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > I can't simply block traffic from a peer carrier, it's not allowed, so there has to be some mechanism to mark 
> > > > > > that a prefix should be allowed, which is what Shaken/Stir does.
> > > > > >
> > > > > > Shane
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > >
> > > > > > On Mon, Oct 3, 2022 at 7:05 PM Michael Thomas <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> > > > > > > The problem has always been solvable at the ingress provider. The 
> > > > > > > problem was that there was zero to negative incentive to do that. You 
> > > > > > > don't need an elaborate PKI to tell the ingress provider which prefixes 
> > > > > > > customers are allow to assert. It's pretty analogous to when submission 
> > > > > > > authentication was pretty nonexistent with email... there was no 
> > > > > > > incentive to not be an open relay sewer. Unlike email spam, SIP 
> > > > > > > signaling is pretty easy to determine whether it's spam. All it needed 
> > > > > > > was somebody to force regulation which unlike email there was always 
> > > > > > > jurisdiction with the FCC.
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > Mike
> > > > > > >
> > > > > > > On 10/3/22 3:13 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> > > > > > > > We're talking about blocking other carriers.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > > On 10/3/22, 3:05 PM, "Michael Thomas" <mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >      On 10/3/22 1:54 PM, Jawaid Bazyar wrote:
> > > > > > > >      > Because it's illegal for common carriers to block traffic otherwise.
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >      Wait, what? It's illegal to police their own users?
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >      Mike
> > > > > > > >
> > > > > > > >      >
> > > > > > > >      > On 10/3/22, 2:53 PM, "NANOG on behalf of Michael Thomas" <nanog-bounces+jbazyar=verobroadband.com () 
> > > > > > > > nanog org on behalf of mike () mtcc com> wrote:
> > > > > > > >      >
> > > > > > > >      >
> > > > > > > >      >      On 10/3/22 1:34 PM, Sean Donelan wrote:
> > > > > > > >      >      > 'Fines alone aren't enough:' FCC threatens to blacklist voice
> > > > > > > >      >      > providers for flouting robocall rules
> > > > > > > >      >      >
> > > > > > > >      >      > https://www.cyberscoop.com/fcc-robocall-fine-database-removal/
> > > > > > > >      >      >
> > > > > > > >      >      > [...]
> > > > > > > >      >      > “This is a new era. If a provider doesn’t meet its obligations under
> > > > > > > >      >      > the law, it now faces expulsion from America’s phone networks. Fines
> > > > > > > >      >      > alone aren’t enough,” FCC chairwoman Jessica Rosenworcel said in a
> > > > > > > >      >      > statement accompanying the announcement. “Providers that don’t follow
> > > > > > > >      >      > our rules and make it easy to scam consumers will now face swift
> > > > > > > >      >      > consequences.”
> > > > > > > >      >      >
> > > > > > > >      >      > It’s the first such enforcement action by the agency to reduce the
> > > > > > > >      >      > growing problem of robocalls since call ID verification protocols
> > > > > > > >      >      > known as “STIR/SHAKEN” went fully into effect this summer.
> > > > > > > >      >      > [...]
> > > > > > > >      >
> > > > > > > >      >      Why did we need to wait for STIR/SHAKEN to do this?
> > > > > > > >      >
> > > > > > > >      >      Mike
> > > > > > > >      >