nanog mailing list archives

Re: Dropping support for the .ru top level domain


From: Denys Fedoryshchenko <nuclearcat () nuclearcat com>
Date: Mon, 14 Mar 2022 22:24:56 +0200

As bad as it is to break an internet service, it's even worse technical side of your idea. Given that there is an agency in Russia that has the ability to intercept and modify all DNS queries, countering your "idea" is trivial. They will just route root servers locally and setup their own zones.
And even if they aren't, replacing root hints in recursor is trivial.
It will take a lot less time than reaching a "authoritative consensus".

But the colossal harm that a violation of neutrality will cause when each country starts making sovereign root servers "just in case", their own DNSSEC, RIR, CA and etc -
will cause much more significant harm to the rest of world.

Please, people who generate such delusional ideas, stop trying to disrupt neutrality of the
Internet.
If you want to get involved in a war, go there, do not drag the rest of the world into the conflict.

On 2022-03-12 12:47, Patrick Bryant wrote:
I don't like the idea of disrupting any Internet service. But the
current situation is unprecedented.

The Achilles Heel of general public use of Internet services has
always been the functionality of DNS.

Unlike Layer 3 disruptions, dropping or disrupting support for the .ru
TLD can be accomplished without disrupting the Russian population's
ability to access information and services in the West.

The only countermeasure would be the distribution of Russian national
DNS zones to a multiplicity of individual DNS resolvers within Russia.
Russian operators are in fact implementing this countermeasure, but it
is a slow and arduous process, and it will entail many of the
operational difficulties that existed with distributing Host files,
which DNS was implemented to overcome.

The .ru TLD could be globally disrupted by dropping the .ru zone from
the 13 DNS root servers. This would be the most effective action, but
would require an authoritative consensus. One level down in DNS
delegation are the 5 authoritative servers. I will leave it to the
imagination of others to envision what action that could be taken
there...

ru      nameserver = a.dns.ripn.net [1]
ru      nameserver = b.dns.ripn.net [2]
ru      nameserver = d.dns.ripn.net [3]
ru      nameserver = e.dns.ripn.net [4]
ru      nameserver = f.dns.ripn.net [5]

The impact of any action would take time (days) to propagate.



Links:
------
[1] http://a.dns.ripn.net
[2] http://b.dns.ripn.net
[3] http://d.dns.ripn.net
[4] http://e.dns.ripn.net
[5] http://f.dns.ripn.net


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