nanog mailing list archives

Re: DOD prefixes and AS8003 / GRSCORP


From: Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog () nanog org>
Date: Tue, 16 Mar 2021 03:00:10 -0700



On Mar 15, 2021, at 15:07 , Tom Beecher <beecher () beecher cc> wrote:

I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well 
over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this 
huge transfer of wealth.

Don’t you?

On Mon, Mar 15, 2021 at 3:35 PM Mel Beckman <mel () beckman org <mailto:mel () beckman org>> wrote:
Owen,

I think one cause for concern is why “almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 
<http://7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8> and bunch of /22s) are now announced under AS8003 <> (GRSCORP) which was 
just formed a few months ago,” which, according to ARIN WHOIS, had a source registry of “DoD Network Information 
Center”. 

Somehow, I’m of the impression that DoD is quite capable of defending their own property if necessary. I’m also not of 
the same belief as you that GRSCORP was just formed a few months ago. It seems to have bounced back and forth between 
Florida and Delaware one or more times, but that’s not all that uncommon for a corporation physically located in 
Florida. Corporations change their state of incorporation somewhat regularly for a variety of legal forum shopping 
purposes, including but not limited to tax advantages, court jurisdictional advantages, etc.


I think it’s a general matter of public interest how this reassignment of a massive government-owned block of well 
over sixteen million IP addresses happened. Even if not fraudulent, the public has a right to know who is behind this 
huge transfer of wealth.

I don’t see a transfer of wealth. I see DOD finally having a contractor originate their prefixes in order to make life 
more difficult for squatters, hijackers, and other miscreants. About time, if you ask me. I mean, I’m sure that in 
order to provide that level of sink-hole, GRSCORP is having to pay some hefty transit bills and maintain some 
significant infrastructure and likely passing all that cost along to DoD at a hefty markup, so I suppose that’s some 
level of transfer of wealth, but as DoD contracts go, I somehow don’t think this one would be regarded as “significant”.

Owen


Don’t you?

 -mel beckman

On Mar 15, 2021, at 12:23 PM, Owen DeLong via NANOG <nanog () nanog org <mailto:nanog () nanog org>> wrote:

 According to the timeline posted to this list (by you, Siyuan), Globl Resource Systems, LLC was registered in 
Delaware on September 8, 2020.
Your timeline also shows the resources being issued to GRS by ARIN on September 11, september 14, 2020
It looks to me like they subsequently registered the corporation in Florida and moved the company address there.

I don’t see anything suspicious here based on your own statements, so I’m a bit confused what you are on about.

Owen

On Mar 12, 2021, at 03:34 , Siyuan Miao <aveline () misaka io <mailto:aveline () misaka io>> wrote:

Hi John,

My biggest concern is why the AS8003 was assigned to the company (GLOBAL RESOURCE SYSTEMS, LLC) even before its 
existence.

When we were requesting resources or transfers, ARIN always asked us to provide a Certificate of Good Standing and 
we had to pay the state to order it.

However, it appears that a Certificate of Good Standing is not required or ARIN didn't validate it in this case. 

Regards,
Siyuan

On Fri, Mar 12, 2021 at 7:17 PM John Curran <jcurran () arin net <mailto:jcurran () arin net>> wrote:
On 11 Mar 2021, at 7:56 AM, Siyuan Miao <aveline () misaka io <mailto:aveline () misaka io>> wrote:

Hi Folks,

Just noticed that almost all DOD prefixes (7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8 
<http://7.0.0.0/8,11.0.0.0/8,22.0.0.0/8> and bunch of /22s)  are now announced under AS8003 (GRSCORP) which was 
just formed a few months ago.

It looks so suspicious. Does anyone know if it's authorized?

Siyuan - 

If you have concerns, you can confirm whether these IP address blocks are being routed as intended by verification 
with their listed technical contacts - e.g. https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0 
<https://search.arin.net/rdap/?query=22.0.0.0>  

As I noted on this list several weeks back - "lack of routing history is not at all a reliable indicator of the 
potential for valid routing of a given IPv4 block in the future, so best practice suggest that allocated address 
space should not be blocked by others without specific cause. Doing otherwise opens one up to unexpected surprises 
when issued space suddenly becomes more active in routing and is yet is inexplicably unreachable for some 
destinations."

Thanks!
/John

John Curran
President and CEO
American Registry for Internet Numbers




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