nanog mailing list archives
Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990
From: Mark Tinka <mark.tinka () seacom com>
Date: Fri, 31 Jul 2020 16:33:22 +0200
On 31/Jul/20 16:07, Job Snijders wrote:
Could it be ... we didn't see any RPKI Invalids through Telia *because* they are rejecting RPKI invalids? As far as I know the BGP Polluter software does not have a configuration setting to only ruin the day of operators without ROAs. :-) I think the system worked as designed: without RPKI ROV @ Telia the damage might have been worse.
Indeed. What I was saying is we don't know how many of the leaked routes were dropped by Telia's ROV, if any. We really shouldn't be having to discuss how bad this could have gotten, because it means we are excusing Telia's inability to do proper filtering across its eBGP sessions with its customers. Mark.
Current thread:
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990, (continued)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Jul 31)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Töma Gavrichenkov (Jul 30)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Job Snijders (Jul 30)
- Message not available
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Patrick Schultz (Jul 30)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Baldur Norddahl (Jul 30)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Aftab Siddiqui (Jul 30)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Jul 31)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Baldur Norddahl (Jul 31)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Jul 31)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Job Snijders (Jul 31)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Mark Tinka (Jul 31)
- Re: BGP route hijack by AS10990 Tom Beecher (Jul 31)