RE: A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking

[Jacques Latour <Jacques.Latour () cira ca>]

DNSSEC should of never been part of the domain registration process, it was because we didn’t have the CDS/CDNSKEY 
channel to automated the DS maintenance and bootstrap. But if you keep DNSSEC maintenance outside the registrar control 
then it can be effective tool (amongst other) in identifying hijacks.  Taking away he ability of the bad actors to 
disable DNSSEC via registrar control panel.

This is what happens when you have all your eggs in one basket and you loose the keys to your kingdom.


From: NANOG <nanog-bounces () nanog org> On Behalf Of Bill Woodcock
Sent: February 26, 2019 4:57 AM
To: Hank Nussbacher <hank () efes iucc ac il>
Cc: nanog () nanog org
Subject: Re: A Deep Dive on the Recent Widespread DNS Hijacking



> On Feb 24, 2019, at 10:03 PM, Hank Nussbacher <hank () efes iucc ac il<mailto:hank () efes iucc ac il>> wrote:
> Did you have a CAA record defined and if not, why not?

It’s something we’d been planning to do but, ironically, we’d been in the process of switching to Let’s Encrypt, and 
they were one of the two CAs whose process vulnerabilities the attackers were exploiting.  So, in this particular case, 
it wouldn’t have helped.

I guess the combination of CAA with a very expensive, or very manual, CA, might be an improvement.  But it’s still a 
band-aid on a bankrupt system.

We need to get switched over to DANE as quickly as possible, and stop wasting effort trying to keep the CA system alive 
with ever-hackier band-aids.

                                -Bill