Re: CGNAT

[Ed Lopez <ed.lopez () corsa com>]

A lot depends on the CGNAT features you are looking to support, some
considerations:

- Are you looking for port block allocation for bulk logging, where a given
subscriber is given a block of source TCP/UDP ports on a translated IP
address
- How many translations and session rate are you looking to support
- Do you require Port Control Protocol (PCP) support for inbound pinholing
reservations?  Do your subscribers support uPnP to PCP translation?
- Are you looking to support RFC 6598 (carrier use of 100.64.0.0/10 for
CGNAT)?
- Are you looking to support DS-Lite (RFC 6333) or lw4o6 (RFC 7596)?  Both
have significantly different requirements relative to CGNAT (DS-Lite
assumes translation of subscriber RFC 1918 addresses tracking their IPv6
address in the translation table, lw4o6 assumes translation from RFC 1918
to RFC 6598 at the subscriber/B4 prior to IPv6 encapsulation plus
translation of RFC 6598 to public at the CGNAT/AFTR)

Generally, I tend to recommend F5 BIG-IP from a CGNAT feature standpoint

- Ed

On Fri, Apr 7, 2017 at 1:48 PM, Aaron Gould <aaron1 () gvtc com> wrote:

> Thanks Rich, you bring up some good points.  Yes it would seem that an
> attack aimed at a target IP address would in-fact now have a greater
> surface
> since that IP address is being used by many people.  When we
> remotely-trigger-black-hole (RTBH) route an ip address (/32 host route)
> into
> a black hole to stop an attack.... you're right, now you've completed the
> ddos, not only for one customer, but hundreds or thousands that were using
> that public ip address through the NAT appliance.  ...to which I've told my
> NOC to not act on any of the /24's-worth of address space the we use for
> NAT.
>
> Interestingly, the nature of NAT is that it doesn't allow in-bound traffic
> unless a previous out-bound packet had been sent from customer-side to
> internet-side and caused the NAT translation to be built.... therefore, an
> outside-initiated DDoS attack would be automatically blocked by a NAT
> boundary*.  This would cause the DDoS to not go as far as it did in the
> non-nat scenario.   ...so with cgnat you've caused your reach of DDoS to be
> shortened.  ...but of course this doesn't cause the DDoS to not occur and
> to
> not reach the NAT boundary...the attack still arrives.  You have to
> continue
> with other layers of security, defense and mitigation in other areas/layers
> of your network.
>
> - Aaron
>
> * (I guess unless they were able to guess-spoof the exact ip address and
> port number of an existing nat session, but then it would seem that they
> would only reach that same port-address-translated session
> destination...which I think would be a single ip address endpoint and port
> number)


-- 

*Ed Lopez* | *Security Architect*
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