nanog mailing list archives

Re: look for BGP routes containing local AS#


From: Patrick Tracanelli <eksffa () freebsdbrasil com br>
Date: Wed, 28 Jan 2015 15:50:10 -0200


On 28/01/2015, at 07:32, Song Li <refresh.lsong () gmail com> wrote:

Hi Joel,

It is right that the BGP route containing the local ASN will be droped. However, such routes can still be displayed 
on router. For example, you can run "show route hidden terse aspath-regex .*<local ASN>.*" on Juniper to check them. 
We are looking for those routes. If you can run the command on your Juniper and find such routes, could you please 
provider them for us?


Sorry, what do you need exactly? A sample? For education purposes are you looking for something specific?
You need it to be on Juniper router or other BGP software will do?

I have this scenario from Brazil-US, with specifics getting received both ways but it’s not Juniper.



Thanks!

Regards!

Song

在 2015/1/28 16:23, joel jaeggli 写道:
On 1/27/15 5:45 AM, Song Li wrote:
Hi everyone,

Recently I studied the BGP AS path looping problem, and found that in
most cases, the received BGP routes containing local AS# are suspicious.
However, we checked our BGP routing table (AS23910,CERNET2) on juniper
router(show route hidden terse aspath-regex .*23910.* ), and have not
found such routes in Adj-RIB-In.

Updates with your AS in the path are discarded as part of loop
detection, e.g. they do not become candidate routes.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4271 page 77

 If the AS_PATH attribute of a BGP route contains an AS loop, the BGP
 route should be excluded from the Phase 2 decision function.  AS loop
 detection is done by scanning the full AS path (as specified in the
 AS_PATH attribute), and checking that the autonomous system number of
 the local system does not appear in the AS path.  Operations of a BGP
 speaker that is configured to accept routes with its own autonomous
 system number in the AS path are outside the scope of this document.

in junos

neighbor { ipAddress | ipv6Address | peerGroupName } allowas-in number

where number is the number of instances of your AS in the path you're
willing to accept will correct that.

We believe that the received BGP routes containing local AS# are related
to BGP security problem.

You'll have to elaborate, since their existence is a basic principle in
the operation of bgp and they are ubiquitous.

Island instances of a distributed ASN communicate with each other by
allowing such routes in so that they can be evaluated one the basis of
prefix, specificity, AS path length and so forth.

Hence, we want to look for some real cases in
the wild. Could anybody give us some examples of such routes?

Thanks!

Best Regards!





-- 
Song Li
Room 4-204, FIT Building,
Network Security,
Department of Electronic Engineering,
Tsinghua University, Beijing 100084, China
Tel:( +86) 010-62446440
E-mail: refresh.lsong () gmail com

--
Patrick Tracanelli

FreeBSD Brasil LTDA.
Tel.: (31) 3516-0800
316601 () sip freebsdbrasil com br
http://www.freebsdbrasil.com.br
"Long live Hanin Elias, Kim Deal!"


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