nanog mailing list archives

Re: Marriott wifi blocking


From: Owen DeLong <owen () delong com>
Date: Fri, 3 Oct 2014 21:39:19 -0700

If there were a duplicate SSID, the. The nefarious user is the one causing illegal harmful interference. 

However, as I understand the case in question, Marriott was blocking stand-up mobile hotspots not attached to their 
wired network or bridged/routed through their wifi. 

As you pointed out, even if this were unauthorized extension of the Marriott network, Marriott's legitimate response 
would have been disconnecting the extension from their network, not causing harmful interference to the other network. 

Owen




On Oct 3, 2014, at 19:57, Hugo Slabbert <hugo () slabnet com> wrote:

Looks like you cut off, but:

Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and what would happen at a business that was 
running rogue AP detection. In the business the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the 
company operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the portable AP would be trying to create a 
different, separate network. And so your thesis does not hold.

But it's not a completely discrete network.  It is a subset of the existing network in the most common example of 
e.g. a WLAN + NAT device providing access to additional clients, or at least an adjacent network attached to the 
existing one.  Okay: theoretically a guest could spin up a hotspot and not attach it to the hotel network at all, but 
I'm assuming that's a pretty tiny edge case.

As the administration of the hotel/org network, I'm within bounds to say you're not allowed attach unauthorized 
devices to the network or extend the network and that should be fair in "my network, my rules", no?  And so I can 
take action against a breach of those terms.

The hotspot is a separate network, but I don't have to allow it to connect to my network.  I guess that points 
towards killing the wired port as a better method, as doing deauth on the hotspot(s) WLAN(s) would mean that you are 
participating in the separate network(s) and causing harm there rather than at the attachment point.

But what then of the duplicate SSID of the nefarious user at the business?  What recourse does the business have 
while still staying in bounds?

--
Hugo

On Fri 2014-Oct-03 22:27:06 -0400, Jay Ashworth <jra () baylink com> wrote:

Except that this is the difference between what happens at a Marriott and what would happen at a business that was 
running rogue AP detection. In the business the portable AP would be trying to look like the network that the 
company operated so as to siphon off legitimate users. In a hotel the portable AP would be trying to create a 
different, separate network. And so your thesis does not hold.

I think this is the distinction we need. Because it's clear that the business thing should be able to happen and the 
hotel thing should

On October 3, 2014 10:25:22 PM EDT, Hugo Slabbert <hugo () slabnet com> wrote:
On Fri 2014-Oct-03 17:21:08 -0700, Michael Van Norman <mvn () ucla edu>
wrote:

IANAL, but I believe they are.  State laws may also apply (e.g.
California
Code - Section 502).  In California, it is illegal to "knowingly and
without permission disrupts or causes the disruption of computer
services
or denies or causes the denial of computer services to an authorized
user
of a computer, computer system, or computer network."  Blocking access
to
somebody's personal hot spot most likely qualifies.

My guess would be that the hotel or other organizations using the
blocking tech would probably just say the users/admin of the rogue APs
are not authorized users as setting up said AP would probably be in
contravention of the AUP of the hotel/org network.


/Mike

--
Hugo

On 10/3/14 5:15 PM, "Mike Hale" <eyeronic.design () gmail com> wrote:

So does that mean the anti-rogue AP technologies by the various
vendors are illegal if used in the US?

On Fri, Oct 3, 2014 at 4:54 PM, Jay Ashworth <jra () baylink com> wrote:
----- Original Message -----
From: "Ricky Beam" <jfbeam () gmail com>

It doesn't. The DEAUTH management frame is not encrypted and
carries no
authentication. The 802.11 spec only requires a reason code be
provided.

What's the code for E_GREEDY?

Cheers,
-- jra
--
Jay R. Ashworth                  Baylink
jra () baylink com
Designer                     The Things I Think
RFC 2100
Ashworth & Associates       http://www.bcp38.info          2000
Land
Rover DII
St Petersburg FL USA      BCP38: Ask For It By Name!           +1
727
647 1274



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-- 
Hugo


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