RE: LinkedIn password database compromised

["Keith Medcalf" <kmedcalf () dessus com>]

Leo,

This will never work.  The "vested profiteers" will all get together and make it a condition that in order to use this 
method the user has to have "purchased" a "verified" key from them.  Every site will use different profiteers (probably 
whoever gives them the biggest kickback).  You will end up paying thousands of dollars a year (as a user) to buy 
multiple keys from the profiteers, and provide them all sorts of private information in the process.  They will then 
also insist that web sites using this method provide "tracking" information on key usage back to the profiteers.  The 
profiteers will then sell all this information to whomever they want, for whatever purpose, so long as it results in a 
profit.  Some of this will get kicked back to participating web sites.  Then there will be "affiliate programs" where 
any web site can "sign up" with the profiteers to "silently" do key exchanges without the users consent so that more 
tracking information can be collected, for which the participating affiliate web site will get a kickback.  Browser 
vendors will "assist" by making the whole process transparent.  Contracts in restraint of trade will be enforced by the 
profiteers to prevent any browser from using the "method" unless it is completely invisible to the user.

Then (in the US) the fascist government will step in and require "registration" of issued keys along with the verified 
real-world identity linkage.

If it does not use self-generated unsigned keys, it will never fly.

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> -----Original Message-----
> From: Leo Bicknell [mailto:bicknell () ufp org]
> Sent: Wednesday, 20 June, 2012 15:39
> To: nanog () nanog org
> Subject: Re: LinkedIn password database compromised
>
> In a message written on Wed, Jun 20, 2012 at 02:19:15PM -0700, Leo Vegoda
> wrote:
> > Key management: doing it right is hard and probably beyond most end users.
>
> I could not be in more violent disagreement.
>
> First time a user goes to sign up on a web page, the browser should
> detect it wants a key uploaded and do a simple wizard.
>
>   - Would you like to create an online identity for logging into web
>     sites?    Yes, No, Import
>
> User says yes, it creates a key, asking for an e-mail address to
> identify it.  Import to drag it in from some other program/format,
> No and you can't sign up.
>
> Browser now says "would you like to sign up for website 'foobar.com'",
> and if the user says "yes" it submits their public key including the
> e-mail they are going to use to log on.  User doesn't even fill out
> a form at all.
>
> Web site still does the usual e-mail the user, click this link to verify
> you want to sign up thing.
>
> User goes back to web site later, browser detects "auth needed" and
> "public key foo" accepted, presents the cert, and the user is logged in.
>
> Notice that these steps _remove_ the user filling out forms to sign up
> for simple web sites, and filling out forms to log in.  Anyone who's
> used cert-based auth at work is already familiar, the web site
> "magically" knows you.  This is MUCH more user friendly.
>
> So the big magic here is the user has to click on "yes" to create a key
> and type in an e-mail once.  That's it.  There's no web of trust.  No
> identity verification (a-la ssl).  I'm talking a very SSH like system,
> but with more polish.
>
> Users would find it much more convenient and wonder why we ever used
> passwords, I think...
>
> --
>        Leo Bicknell - bicknell () ufp org - CCIE 3440
>         PGP keys at http://www.ufp.org/~bicknell/