nanog mailing list archives
Re: LinkedIn password database compromised
From: James Snow <snow () teardrop org>
Date: Thu, 7 Jun 2012 06:22:40 -0700
On Wed, Jun 06, 2012 at 11:14:58PM -0700, Aaron C. de Bruyn wrote:
Imaging signing up for a site by putting in your email and pasting your public key.
Yes! Yes! Yes! I've been making this exact argument for about a year. It even retains the same "email a link" reset mechanism when someone needs to reset their key. A common counter-argument is, "But ordinary Internet users won't understand SSH keys." They don't need to! The idea is easily explained via a lock-and-key metaphor that people already understand. The UI for walking users through key creation is easily imagined. -Snow
Current thread:
- LinkedIn password database compromised Lynda (Jun 06)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Marshall Eubanks (Jun 06)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Aaron C. de Bruyn (Jun 06)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Jimmy Hess (Jun 06)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Aaron C. de Bruyn (Jun 06)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised James Snow (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Peter Kristolaitis (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised JC Dill (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Aaron C. de Bruyn (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Owen DeLong (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Mark Andrews (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Randy Bush (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Sean Harlow (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Randy Bush (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Aaron C. de Bruyn (Jun 06)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Marshall Eubanks (Jun 06)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised Leo Bicknell (Jun 07)
- Re: LinkedIn password database compromised jeff murphy (Jun 07)