nanog mailing list archives
Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model
From: George Herbert <george.herbert () gmail com>
Date: Thu, 24 Mar 2011 14:44:52 -0700
On Thu, Mar 24, 2011 at 2:39 PM, Franck Martin <franck () genius com> wrote:
----- Original Message -----From: "Roland Dobbins" <rdobbins () arbor net> To: "nanog group" <nanog () nanog org> Sent: Friday, 25 March, 2011 9:33:27 AM Subject: Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model On Mar 24, 2011, at 6:41 PM, Florian Weimer wrote:Disclosure devalues information.I think this case is different, given the perception of the cert as a 'thing' to be bartered.Isn't there any law that obliges company to disclose security breaches that involve consumer data?
I don't think SSL certs are consumer data, per se. Back on original point - if the *actual effective* model of browser security is browsers with an internal revoked cert list - then there's a case to be made that a pre-announcement in private to the browser vendors, enough time for them to spin patches, and then widespread public discussion is the most responsible model approach. The public knowing before their browser knows how to handle the bad cert isn't helpful, unless you can effectively tell people how to get their browser to actually go verify every cert. -- -george william herbert george.herbert () gmail com
Current thread:
- The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Martin Millnert (Mar 23)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Dobbins, Roland (Mar 23)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Joakim Aronius (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Dobbins, Roland (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Florian Weimer (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Dobbins, Roland (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Franck Martin (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model George Herbert (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Joakim Aronius (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Owen DeLong (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Joakim Aronius (Mar 24)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Florian Weimer (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Dobbins, Roland (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Crist Clark (Mar 28)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Florian Weimer (Mar 29)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Crist Clark (Mar 29)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Dobbins, Roland (Mar 23)
- RE: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Akyol, Bora A (Mar 25)
- Re: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Valdis . Kletnieks (Mar 25)
- RE: The state-level attack on the SSL CA security model Akyol, Bora A (Mar 25)