nanog mailing list archives

RE: Worms versus Bots


From: "Michel Py" <michel () arneill-py sacramento ca us>
Date: Mon, 3 May 2004 20:53:50 -0700


William wrote:
but in our ISP office I setup new win2000 servers and first
thing I do is download all the patches. I've yet to see the
server get infected in the 20-30 minutes it takes to finish it

It can happen in 5 or 10 minutes (I've seen it) but only if all of the
following conditions are met simultaneously:
a) administrator's password blank (or something
   _really_ easy to guess)
b) public IP (no NAT)
c) no firewall
In other words: if one is stupid, one gets worm'ed or bot'ed.

(Note: I also disable IIS just in case until
everything is patched..).

Not a bad idea, but sometimes you don't have the choice of doing it
(with scripted installs or things like SBS). Besides, IIS is not the
main source of trouble on a machine that sits on the Internet
unprotected. I consider disabling IIS a second or third line of defense,
to be used after you implemented the steps not to get screwed in the
first place (which you described).

Similarly when settting up computers for several of my
relatives (all have dsl) I've yet to see any infection
before all updates are installed.

Me too.


Additional to that many users have dsl router or similar
device and many such beasts will provide NATed ip block
and act like a firewall not allowing outside servers to
actually connect to your home computer.

Indeed. I have a $10 one that I use for installations (even when I
install from a "trusted" environment), because the danger does not come
only from the Internet, it can also come from your own LAN. By putting
the machine being installed alone on its own segment behind a NAT box,
you also shield yourself from crud that could be on the trusted network.

On this point it would be really interested to see what
percentage of users actually have these routers and if
decreasing speed of infections by new virus (is there
real numbers to show it decreased?) have anything to
do with this rather then people being more carefull and
using antivirus.

Difficult to measure, and here's why: recent worms are polymorphic and
propagate/replicate using many different mechanisms.  How do you make
the difference between a) a worm that arrived trough email and then
contaminated x machines on your LAN and b) a worm that arrived through a
vulnerability of IIS and then contaminated x machines on your LAN?

The trouble here is that if you had all the time in the world _and_ if
you did not have x users screaming, you could look at logs and such and
finally figure out which of the egg or the chicken was first. In a real
world, you clean the mess and when you are done you have to catch up
with all the stuff you did not do while cleaning, and you never know.

Michel.


Current thread: