nanog mailing list archives

Re: AV/FW Adoption Sudies


From: Valdis.Kletnieks () vt edu
Date: Thu, 10 Jun 2004 17:56:01 -0400

On Thu, 10 Jun 2004 13:50:47 PDT, Eric Rescorla said:

I'm asking the question:
If you find some bug in the normal course of your operations
(i.e. nobody told you where to look) how likely is it that
someone else has already found it?

And you're asking a question more like:
Given that you hear about a bug before its release, how likely
is it that some black hat alredy knows?

I think that the answer to the first question is probably
"fairly low". I agree that the answer to the second question is
probably "reasonably high".

Third case:  Exploit in one package identified because of info from a similar
exploit against some *other* package....

Back in March 2000, I spotted a rather nasty security bug in
Sendmail (fixed in 8.10.1) when running under AIX or SunOS.   Since the problem
is a documented *feature* of the system linker, a *lot* of software had the
problem - and the Sendmail release notes give enough info to make it "game
over".  At that point, the 3 big things left were (a) writing a general-case
exploit (trivial if you use one of the another one of the basic design goals of
the AIX linker against itself), (b) creating a shell one-liner to identify
vulnerable programs, and (c) running the script from (b).  Of the three, (c)
was actually the most time-consuming.

3 years later, another package (OpenSSH) hit the same hole:
http://www.securityfocus.com/archive/1/320149/2003-04-30/2003-05-06/0

And it was a known issue months before I tripped over it:
http://mail.gnome.org/archives/gtk-devel-list/1999-November/msg00047.html

I'd be most surprised if black hats did *not* have an exploit for the
OpenSSH variant, having been pointed at the issue due to my finding a
similar issue in Sendmail.....

And there's *plenty* of evidence that when a novel attack is found, you see
lots of people posting "So I was bored and decided to see what *else* had the
same sort of bug..." (think "buffer overflow" ;)

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