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Re: Vulnerbilities of Interconnection


From: alex () yuriev com
Date: Thu, 5 Sep 2002 14:45:51 -0400 (EDT)


That said, a few years back I wrote the "Interconnection Strategies for 
ISPs" white paper, which speaks to the economics of peering using exchange 
points vs. using pt-to-pt circuits. It documents a clear break even point 
where large capacity circuits (or dark fiber loops) into an IX with fiber 
cross connects within a building are a better fit (financially) than 
pt-to-pt circuits.

This obviously would be a thesis of Equinix and other collo space providers,
since this is exactly the service that they provide. It won't, hower, be a
thesis of any major network that either already has a lot of infrastructure
in place or has to be a network that is supposed to survive a physical
attack. 
 
A couple physical security considerations came out of that research:
1) Consider that man holes are not always secured, providing access to 
metro fiber runs, while there is generally greater security within 
colocation environments

This is all great, except that the same metro fiber runs are used to get
carriers into the super-secure facility, and, since neither those who
originate information, nor those who ultimately consume the information are
located completely within facility, you still have the same problem.  If we
add to it that the diverse fibers tend to aggregate in the basement of the
building that houses the facility, multiple carriers use the same manholes
for their diverse fiber and so on.

2) It is faster to repair physical disruptions at fewer points, leveraging 
cutovers to alternative providers present in the collocation IX model, as 
opposed to the Direct Circuit model where provisioning additional 
capacities to many end points may take days or months.

This again is great in theory, unless you are talking about someone who
is planning on taking out the IX not accidently, but deliberately. To
illustrate this, one just needs to recall the infamous fiber cut in McLean
in 1999 when a backhoe not just cut Worldcom and Level(3) circuits, but
somehow let a cement truck to pour cement into Verizon's manhole that was
used by Level(3) and Worldcom. 

Alex


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