nanog mailing list archives

Re: Effective ways to deal with DDoS attacks?


From: dies <dies () pulltheplug com>
Date: Wed, 1 May 2002 20:17:04 -0500 (EST)



Then you are pushing out /32's and peers would need to accept them.  Then
someone will want to blackhole /30's, /29's, etc.  Route bloat.  Yum!

Additionally you are creating a way to basically destroy the Internet as a
whole.  One kiddie gets ahold of a router, say of a large backbone
provider, takes one of their aggregate blocks (/16? /10? /8?) and splits
it into /32 announcements.

Anyways, some providers already allow you to set a community on a route,
and they will inturn "blackhole" it for you.  I believe Teleglobe does
this for some customers and I know UUNet does this for all customers.

On Wed, 1 May 2002, Wojtek Zlobicki wrote:


What processes and/or tools are large networks using to
identify and limit the impact of DDoS attacks?

A great deal of thought is being expended on this question, I am certain,
however, how many of these thought campaings have born significant fruit
yet,
I do not know.

How about the following :

We develop a new community , being fully transitive (666 would be
appropriate ) and either build into router code or create a route map to
null route anything that contains this community.  The effect of this being
the distribution of the force of the attack.

This aside, how effective would be using a no export community with ones
peers (being non transitive, it would still distribute the force of the
attack).





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