nanog mailing list archives

Re: Telco's write best practices for packet switching networks


From: "Christopher L. Morrow" <chris () UU NET>
Date: Fri, 8 Mar 2002 04:42:40 +0000 (GMT)




On Thu, 7 Mar 2002, Sean Donelan wrote:



My comment was originally prompted by the meeting minutes which
reported on the survey data showing that 100% of carriers are implementing
firewalls in their gateways.  The 100% is what caught my eye.  As the
topic comes up in various places, large ISPs repeatedly say they are
unable to implement filters or packet screening on their high-speed
links such as at peering points.  So the self-reported 100% implementation
of screening and filtering firewalls at gateways didn't seem to jive
with my understanding of the limitations faced by large ISPs.

Yes... hmm, I didn't read the report/minutes BUT I'd think this might mean
2 things:
1) the filtering is on the gateways (routers) 'for the router' (vty acls,
loopback filters, snmp filters, ntp filters...)
2) the filtering is on the ISP's corporate connection to the 'internet'

I'd think 1 more likely the correct interpretation than 2. I'd doubt this
was meant to be applied to 'all interfaces on the gateways' in the sense
that all interfaces have a traffic filter on them.  That really isn't a
scalable/managable/workable (without melting a router) solution. (yes, I
know a juniper can probably filter on all interfaces at 'line rate' but
not everyone has junipers at their edge so the 100% would not apply here)


Firewalls can be a useful tool in the security engineer's toolbox.  But
they get misused a lot.  I don't believe security engineers are better
programmers.  If there was a class of programmers in the world that didn't
make mistakes, I would hire them to write the applications. When the
firewall is more complex than the application server it is "protecting"
which is likely to have more mistakes?




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