nanog mailing list archives

Re: engineering --> ddos and flooding


From: Hank Nussbacher <hank () att net il>
Date: Mon, 04 Jun 2001 07:13:23 +0200


At 14:36 01/06/01 -0400, Mark Mentovai wrote:

Walter Prue wrote:
>I came up with a solution for networks with ISP connections to deal
>quickly with DDOS attacks without having to be able to work with a
>network technician at the ISP for immediate relief.  If the ISP agrees,
>install a second low speed connection to the same router your primary
>router BGP peers with.  Through this low speed connection you run a
>second bgp session advertising the /32 that is being attacked by the
>DDOS.  You mark the /32 as NO-ADVERTISE so the route doesn't leave the
>border router.

Or, without adding an extra connection, negotiate a NULLROUTE community with
your upstream provider.  This would be a wonderful addition to the
well-known BGP communities.  I'll bring this up on IDR.

Assuming not adding the extra connection, this means that upstream prefix filtering, so that one can't mistakenly inject 255 /24s rather than a single /16, would go out the window. Now think about /32s and what the routing tables will start to look like. Now consider that the upstream would also want to send to its upstream Tier-1 the NULLROUTE /32 as well so that his bandwidth is not eaten up as well and we have a situation whereby routing table size will triple in size every year.

-Hank


Mark


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