RE: ISP contracts and government intervention

["Daniel Golding" <dan () netrail net>]

> order does not exist to prevent or stop suck service. The only

This should say "such service". Freudian slip, perhaps.

> "credentials"
> someone needs is a positive return on a Dun and Bradstreet credit report.
> Paying in advance tends to get around even that.
>
> Check out HavenCo, and it's purpose. I think it may be the sort
> of thing you
> are looking for, although I would certainly never call it a "blackhat"
> operation, as it is completely above board, just not interested in
> government (over)regulation.
>
> ("hats" are for hackers. I don't think you'll find many folks who
> wear such
> figurative headgear on NANOG)
>
> - Daniel Golding
>
>
>
> > -----Original Message-----
> > From: owner-nanog () merit edu [mailto:owner-nanog () merit edu]On Behalf Of
> > ethanpreston () hushmail com
> > Sent: Monday, July 02, 2001 2:16 AM
> > To: nanog () merit edu
> > Subject: ISP contracts and government intervention
> >
> >
> > Apologies in advance for the non-technical nature of the query. I
> > am a law
> > student researching a law review article on censorship on the Internet.
> > My partner and I are investigating the legal consequences of
> > placing a ISP
> > offshore, in a jurisdiction like Anguilla, Nevis, the Caymen Islands or
> > some other place like that. Part of our problem is that we're
> ignorant of
> > the business practice in the area. I figured I'd go to the
> horse's mouth,
> >  rather than playing footsie on the legal lists.
> >
> > Its probable that the ISP could be run in an offshore jursidiction with
> > strong financial secrecy regulations and any U.S.-based managers/owners
> > would be insulated from legal action because they could not be
> identified
> > (at least, with American subponeas.) On the other hand, a U.S.
> > judge could
> > presumably order the offshore ISP's U.S.-based upstream ISP to
> > cut off that
> > ISP (or even the entire jurisdiction, depending on the situation)
> > for DMCA
> > violations, gambling, etc. Basically, its an issue of how the community
> > would go about dealing with a blackhat ISP.
> >
> > An initial question is how closely do backbone providers/upstream
> > ISPs look
> > at offshore ISPs to begin with? What kind of identification/credentials
> > does an ISP need to come up with to get a contract? Specifically,
> > do backbone
> > providers figure out who the beneficial owner of an ISP is before
> > they hook
> > up the ISP? If someone pays the bills regularly, do they need
> > anything more
> > than what's in whois.arin.net?
> >
> > The next set of questions deal with how long a blackhat ISP could
> > stay connected.
> > Under what circumstances would an upstream ISP/backbone provider cut off
> > the offshore ISP before a court order? What are the choices in
> the market
> > for backbone providers that are not U.S.-based (and therefore
> wouldn't be
> > subject to U.S. legal process)?
> >
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