nanog mailing list archives

Re: New form of packet attack named Stream


From: "Damon M. Conway" <damon () chiba 3jane net>
Date: Fri, 21 Jan 2000 14:20:39 -0600


 Pat Myrto wrote:

Alex P. Rudnev has declared that:


e-mail me asking for the code.

Actually, you provided enough details, so any unix guy who knows
his sockets can write the program in fifteen minutes.

This type of attack was known for a long time (and there are even
nastier variations using TCP header bits and fragments), and, unfortunately,
there's no good defense against it.
There is one base rule - you (OS) MUST limit resources (CPU, MEMORY, buffers,
sockets, etc) catched by any SINGLE origin (IP address, program, service).

Such approach broke just any except a few DoS attacks - for example, if you try
to exhaust memory attaking single service, then (1) service can't catch all
memory because it's the SINGLE origin, and (2) one SRC address can't catch many
resources because it's SINGLE origin, and (3) you can't generate too many
different addresses in case of reverse-filtering.

Any ideas/suggestions to hacks to kernel, etc (i.e., freebsd, linux, etc)
to impose such limits (configurable by admin, preferably)?  Especially
in the CPU usage and memory areas (perhaps sockets/handles, too).

from freebsd-current yesterday:

Subject: half-fix for stream.c
http://www.freebsd.org/~alfred/tcp_fix.diff

damon



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