nanog mailing list archives

Re: Re[2]: SYN floods (was: does history repeat itself?)


From: Joel Gallun <joel () wauug erols com>
Date: Thu, 12 Sep 1996 14:52:10 -0400 (EDT)

What you propose is a Good Thing (tm), but I don't think it's sufficient.
It still doesn't protect the 'net from antisocial behavior perpetrated by
someone who has penetrated a system with dedicated access to the 'net. It
seems like it would still be necessary for anyone selling dedicated access
to install Good Neighboor (tm) anti-spoofing filters on their inbound
interfaces (which probably requires MIPS that the routers in the field
don't have).

Regards,

Joel

On Thu, 12 Sep 1996, John G. Scudder wrote:

At 1:44 PM -0400 9/12/96, Curtis Villamizar wrote:
I agree with you completely -- sort of.  Only problem is there are
thought to be some 3,000 dial access providers.  Many of them barely
know what a TCP SYN is, let alone why they need to block ones with
random source addresses and how.  Unless of course you are
                                   ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
volunteering to explain it and help them.  Thanks in advance.  :-)
 ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^

Curtis, this is a great point.  USR and other NAS vendors are actually in a
great position to do exactly this, by changing their boxes to block random
addresses *by default* on dial-up ports.  This is of course exactly the
point Vadim and others keep making, and of course as they point out there
ought to be a knob to disable it if desired.

Insofar as guys who "barely know what a TCP SYN is" are unlikely to twist
the knobs, defaulting filtering to "block spoofed addresses" seems like the
best and maybe only way to get them to do it.

How about it, USR &al?

--John

--
John Scudder                        email:  jgs () ieng com
Internet Engineering Group, LLC     phone:  (313) 669-8800
122 S. Main, Suite 280              fax:    (313) 669-8661
Ann Arbor, MI  41804                www:    http://www.ieng.com



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