Re: Must Read TSA overreaction to Delta incident

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Matt Blaze <mab () crypto com>
Date: December 26, 2009 3:39:30 PM EST
To: dave () farber net
Cc: "ip" <ip () v2 listbox com>
Subject: Re: [IP] Must Read TSA overreaction to Delta incident

(For IP if you like)

Stewart makes an excellent point - if this hapless would-be bomber was already known to US intelligence, several 
post-9/11 systems apparently must have failed in order for him to be able to obtain a US visa and board a plane in the 
first place.

The immediate reaction has been to scramble to put in place new and inexplicable ways to take the failed bombing 
attempt out on the rest of us.  If the Air Canada web site is to be believed, from now on during the last hour of 
flight passengers will be prohibited from any access to carry on, including small items kept on one's lap.  So we're 
now protected from someone trying exactly the same thing as before during exactly the same part of the flight as 
before, in exchange for having an hour with nothing to do (except to think quietly about whether our seatmates might 
secretly be suicide bombers) at the end of every flight.  I feel safer already.

Don't get me wrong; as a fairly frequent flyer (and confirmed coward), I want air travel to be as safe as possible.  
But I worry that by emphasizing aviation security as the most visible focal point of our anti-terrorist program, we've 
lost all sense of proportion.   And the policies seem to be entirely reactive to whatever the bad guys did the last 
time.

Actually, I think it's worth looking at what went right here in addition to what went wrong.  According to news 
reports, the passengers and flight crew apparently reacted very quickly, putting out the fire and restraining the 
culprit as soon as it was clear that something was amiss.  This suggests that between the reinforced cockpit doors and 
the new mantra of "don't cooperate with hijackers", successfully taking down an airplane may really be harder than it 
once was.

-matt

mab blogs at http://www.crypto.com/blog




> > From: Stewart Baker <stewart.baker () gmail com>
> > Date: December 26, 2009 2:37:10 PM EST
> > To: dave () farber net
> > Subject: Re: [IP] re TSA overreaction to Delta incident
> >
> > A different take (as posted on www.skatingonstilts.com):
> >
> > Al Qaeda Failed. What About Us? Ten Questions.
> >
> > Early reports about the failed Christmas bombing of NW 253 raise
> > questions that need answers.  Because, frankly, if the reports are
> > true, al Qaeda never should have gotten this close to a successful
> > attack.
> >
> > 1.  According to early reports, the suspect is 23-year-old Abdul
> > Farouk Abdulmutallab, and his name "appears to be included in the
> > government's records of terrorist suspects, according to a preliminary
> > review."  The first question, then, is how he managed to get a visa to
> > come to the United States.
> >
> > 2.  One report suggested that the visa was granted to attend a
> > religious meeting. Is there some political correctness problem that
> > makes State reluctant to deny visas for such travel?
> >
> > 3.  A visa might have been granted for a good reason (a chance to
> > interrogate or arrest him) but only in circumstances where he was
> > watched closely.  At a minimum, data about him should have gone to DHS
> > and FBI from State.  Did it?
> >
> > 4.  Even if it didn't, TSA and DHS should have identified him as a
> > possible risk from his travel reservations.  Did they?  If not, why
> > not?
> >
> > 5.  If they did, was he screened specially at Schiphol?  Did DHS put
> > an air marshal on his flight?
> >
> > 6.  Sometimes travel reservation data is spotty and badly recorded,
> > but that shouldn't be true for the passenger manifests that NW should
> > have sent to DHS.  Those should come straight off the passport.  Did
> > it?  Should airlines be held liable for deaths caused by bad manifest
> > information?
> >
> > 7.  How good was the air travel screening in Nigeria?
> >
> > 8.  If it wasn't that good, and I suspect it wasn't, in part because
> > the plane was not bound for the US, did Schiphol fall down on the job
> > by not properly rescreening Abdulmutallab?
> >
> > 9.  Have we let European objections to US screening standards affect
> > the security of flights with connecting passengers?
> >
> > 10.  One passenger is said to have helped thwart the attack by
> > climbing over several less active passengers to grapple with the
> > terrorist, apparently suffering burns to his hands in the process.
> > How long will it take Secretary Napolitano (at least) or President
> > Obama (my preference) to visit this guy in the hospital if these facts
> > turn out to be true?  Passengers are the last and most effective line
> > of defense in cases like this.  But the incentives to sit tight are
> > still great.  We need to honor the heroes who react quickly to thwart
> > attacks in the air.
> >
> > Update:  Many thanks to Instapundit, BigGovernment, and Volokh
> > Conspiracy, among others, for the links.  They've spurred some
> > interesting comments, and one by hiscross about AQQ is important
> > enough to generate an 11th question.
> > AQQ is a program in which passport downloads collected by the airline
> > are supposed to be sent to DHS *before* the plane takes off. Under
> > AQQ, the airline is also supposed to be able to receive a return
> > message from DHS requiring that suspect passengers be removed from the
> > plane.
> >
> > (AQQ is also that most dreaded of government innovations, the
> > recursive acronym, in which one acronym nestles comfortably inside
> > another.  Thus, AQQ stands for APIS Quick Query, which tells you
> > nothing unless you know that APIS stands for Advance Passenger
> > Information System.  APIS was the earlier, slower, one-way version of
> > AQQ.)
> >
> > DHS made the AQQ requirement final more than a year ago, after a long
> > testing period.  But a number of US carriers have been stiffing DHS,
> > refusing to comply with the regulation because, they say, they can't
> > afford to upgrade their computer systems. They say they're waiting to
> > see what upgrades they'll have to make for the TSA Secure Flight
> > program, but I find it astonishing that a private regulated industry
> > would simply declare that it won't comply with US law. When you do
> > that, you have to expect consequences -- or be very lucky.  As a
> > result of airline noncompliance, it is hard for DHS to keep bad guys
> > off planes, even if the bad guys have been identified from their
> > passports. If Delta/NW falls into the carrier-scofflaw category, and
> > that failure contributed to the incident, they are are, and should be,
> > in trouble. In addition, I'm guessing, DHS will immediately begin
> > fining the other carriers who have been rope-a-doping them.
> >
> > So call it question 11: Was Delta/NW in compliance with US law when it
> > boarded the Amsterdam flight?





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