Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies - WSJ.com

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Rahul Tongia <tongia () cmu edu>
Date: April 9, 2009 4:47:21 AM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Cc: ip <ip () v2 listbox com>, Rahul Tongia <tongia () cmu edu>
Subject: Re: [IP] Re:    Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies  
- WSJ.com
Reply-To: tongia () cmu edu

Dave,

Being involved in both these areas, I will confirm what you stated.   
Security can be designed lightweight, if it is thought through! If  
anyone wants more information, one should talk to Cylab and CERT folks  
in this space (CMU entities), esp. dealing with issues of  
cyberinfrastructure security relevant to the power grid.

A fundamental Q for power systems is what is communications being used  
for: revenue generative options (billing, real-time metering, etc.) or  
control.  They aren't mutually exclusive, but need careful thinking  
through.  The latter needs predictability and security more than  
speed. The former, especially adding heavy-weight apps, does need  
modest bandwidth.  How much bandwidth depends on the design, and where  
the data is sent for analysis, "intelligence" etc.
I will share an anecdote from a European power utility from a few  
years back.  They decided to use a pre-existing wireless network  
(cellular) for carrying utility data between nodes. They struck a hard  
bargain with the carrier for bulk rates, and then added penalty  
clauses for non-performance.  It turned out the utility did the math.   
Carrying SMS (text) messages was worth more than the data+penalties.
A dirty little secret of this space is no one knows exactly what  
designs, with what level of penetration, etc. are economically  
optimal.  Like most things, these depend on assumptions, and every  
utility is different.  [IMHO this space is a process, not a product -  
a major challenge dealing with some utilities, esp. in developing  
countries, that use archaic tendering (bidding) systems].

A student's thesis recently quantified that the overwhelming majority  
of demand response (load management) benefits came from a subset of  
consumers (always sub-majority, sometimes surprisingly so).  BUT,  
relatively few utilities are thinking the issues of scaling, growth,  
etc. through fully.  A meter lasts 15-20 years. Can we easily think of  
any communications platform that has remained unchanged over 20+  
years? RJ-11 and RJ45 are exceptions, in some ways. Rahul

[Disclaimer: These are my views, and I was on the Tech. Advisory Board  
for Southern California Edison's Smart Connect project.]

--

************************************************************************
Rahul Tongia, Ph.D.
Senior Systems Scientist

Program in Computation, Organizations, and Society (COS)
School of Computer Science (ISR) /
Dept. of Engineering & Public Policy

Carnegie Mellon University
Pittsburgh, PA 15213 USA
tel: 412-268-5619
fax: 412-268-2338
email: tongia () cmu edu
http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~rtongia



David Farber wrote:
> There are a number of claims or at least implications in the quoted  
> section that disturbed me. My limited experience with power industry  
> suggests that the problem is architectural and computational grabber  
> than just communications  speed.
>
> Dave
>
>
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: Peter Swire <peter () peterswire net>
> Date: April 8, 2009 11:07:29 AM EDT
> To: "dave () farber net" <dave () farber net>
> Subject: RE: [IP] Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies -  
> WSJ.com
>
> Hi Dave:
>
> On cybersecurity for the electric grid, this morning, by  
> coincidence, I released a relevant report through the Center for  
> American Progress.  Most of the report explains ways that the "smart  
> grid" electricity part of the Recovery Act can be integrated better  
> with the broadband part of the Act.
>
> On cybersecurity, the report says:
>
> "the smart grid we are building needs better communications to keep  
> itself "smart." Deployment of broadband at the regional level can  
> help the electricity grid itself to work more effectively by using  
> expanded access to information to operate more efficiently.One vital  
> advantage is to use the new broadband for improved cybersecurity for  
> the electric grid. Experts in critical infrastructure have  
> emphasized the risk of cyberattacks on the electricity  
> infrastructure, threatening to shut down power to entire geographic  
> areas.  The current, relatively weak communications infrastructure  
> places limits on counter-measures against such attacks.  With  
> improved broadband for the grid itself, stronger encryption and  
> other counter-measures can protect the grid from cyberattacks."
>
> Also:
>
> "many older SCADA systems "cannot accommodate current enterprise  
> security solutions that soak up central processing unit (CPU)  
> capacity and clog connectivity."  Id.  Improved broadband, installed  
> as part of the new electricity infrastructure, would thus directly  
> contribute to upgrading the cybersecurity of the transmission system."
>
> The report is called "Smart Grid, Smart Broadband, Smart  
> Infrastructure: Melding Federal Stimulus Programs to Ensure More  
> Bank for the Buck."
>
> http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/04/smart_infrastructure.html
>
> Peter
>
>
>
> Prof. Peter P. Swire
> C. William O'Neill Professor of Law
> Moritz College of Law of the Ohio State University
> Senior Fellow, Center for American Progress
> (240) 994.4142, www.peterswire.net
>
>
> -----Original Message-----
> From: David Farber [mailto:dave () farber net]
> Sent: Wednesday, April 08, 2009 4:00 AM
> To: ip
> Subject: [IP] Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies - WSJ.com
>
>
>
> http://online.wsj.com/article_email/SB123914805204099085-lMyQjAxMDI5MzA5ODEwNDg4Wj.html
>
> By SIOBHAN GORMAN
> Associated Press
> Robert Moran monitors an electric grid in Dallas. Such infrastructure
> grids across the country are vulnerable to cyberattacks.
>
> WASHINGTON -- Cyberspies have penetrated the U.S. electrical grid and
> left behind software programs that could be used to disrupt the
> system, according to current and former national-security officials.
>
> The spies came from China, Russia and other countries, these officials
> said, and were believed to be on a mission to navigate the U.S.
> electrical system and its controls. The intruders haven't sought to
> damage the power grid or other key infrastructure, but officials
> warned they could try during a crisis or war.
>
> "The Chinese have attempted to map our infrastructure, such as the
> electrical grid," said a senior intelligence official. "So have the
> Russians."
>
> The espionage appeared pervasive across the U.S. and doesn't target a
> particular company or region, said a former Department of Homeland
> Security official. "There are intrusions, and they are growing," the
> former official said, referring to electrical systems. "There were a
> lot last year."
>
> <snip>
>
>
>
> -------------------------------------------
> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now
> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/
> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com
>
>
>
>
> -------------------------------------------
> Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now
> RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/
> Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com




-------------------------------------------
Archives: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/247/=now
RSS Feed: https://www.listbox.com/member/archive/rss/247/
Powered by Listbox: http://www.listbox.com