Another youtube-ish BGP problem threatens the global routing tables

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: "jamie rishaw" <j () arpa com>
Date: November 11, 2008 1:04:23 AM EST
To: dave () farber net
Subject: Another youtube-ish BGP problem threatens the global routing  
tables

[For IP]

  You may recall the event just a few months ago that alleged a  
Pakistani "hijack" of the BGP route-advertisements leading to  
Youtube..  the same is under way as I type this.

:: Short Story / "Breaking News" ::

  Hundreds to thousands of networks connected to the internet are  
being threatened and "black holed" by what appears to be a failure of  
trust in the policies implementing the Internet routing protocol BGP.

:: More details :: -->

  Thousands of network routes on the Internet are being  
advertised('originated') by an end-point-network that should NOT be  
doing so. (To put in other terms, Company XYZ is advertising the IP  
routes of companies A, B, C, D, 123, 99F, D3ADB33F and nine thousand  
others -- black-hole-ing them to major parts of the internet).

  How?  In the sometimes blind trust that network operators give  
other network operators, a failure to limit the BGP 'advertisements'  
of customers' networks is turning into a sharp reminder of the  
fragility of our Internets.  (All of them).  ;)

  I'm going to go "out on a limb" here and assert that while I don't  
believe what's going on right now is an Attack, it certainly  
highlights and front-burners the reality that our global routing  
tables are extremely vulnerable.  As an extremely bright fellow  
engineer[1] pointed out recently, BGP is a fragile - nay - crumbling -  
protocol and practice that needs to be rearchitected.

  The routing of my own networks and the networks of many others was  
brought front-burner tonight when alerts were raised[2] about possible  
route-hijacking.  Intended to serve the purpose of alerting of  
situations just like this, network operators across in the states and  
across the pond collaborated on the NANOG (the North American Network  
Operators' Group) mailing list, and, of course, real-time in a private  
realtime-messaging environment.  Call after call was made, to deaf  
ears, and the network advertisements persist.

  Nobody anticipates any response before tomorrow, at which point  
damage has been  done.

  Serious improvements to. and rearchitecture of, the limitations and  
vulnerabilities of BGP, needs to be brought to light.  Two incidents,  
both directly attributable to bgp, in one six month period, are  
proving to be serious challenges to the "structural integrity" of the  
Internet.

  What will it take to get serious response?

-jamie


[1] Tony Kapela, http://blog.wired.com/27bstroke6/2008/08/revealed-the-in.html
[2] Via BGPMon, bgpmon.net

--
jamie rishaw <j *(at)* arpa-dot-com>
arpa :: instigating advancement
did :: +1-(800)-827-2096 x100




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