Re: more on Air Mauritania's innovative airline security

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

Begin forwarded message:

From: Max Tulyev <maxtul () netassist kiev ua>
Date: March 25, 2007 4:55:50 PM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Subject: Re: [IP] more on Air Mauritania's innovative airline security

Dave,

One time I flew by Kuwait airlines. There was very sharp metal knifes
and forks during the meal. I wounder about it, and ask about it to my
neighbor.

He said, "Come on, let's try to hijack a plane full of arabs with sharp
knifes!!!"

So I think we should change not screening system, but people's mind.

David Farber wrote:
> Begin forwarded message:
>
> From: Adam Fields <ip20398470293845 () aquick org>
> Date: February 17, 2007 9:09:57 PM EST
> To: David Farber <dave () farber net>
> Cc: ip () v2 listbox com
> Subject: Re: [IP] more on Air Mauritania's innovative airline security
>
> For IP, if you wish:
>
> On Sat, Feb 17, 2007 at 08:52:28PM -0500, David Farber wrote:
> [...]
> > One has to wonder how the guy was able to get on board with not one,
> > but two guns.
>
> It's not at all that hard to wonder. Repeated tests have shown that
> the security screening isn't even CLOSE to 100% success. It's not even
> close to 50%, and this is just the tests of the public screening
> system, without any inside help or nefarious side channels (i.e.:
> walking directly through security with a weapon of some kind).
>
> This incident illustrates an important point. Keeping weapons off the
> plane is NOT the most important thing. It is not possible to hijack a
> plane anymore without killing or incapacitating everyone on board
> first - the passengers won't let you, as they'll now assume that
> they're going to die regardless of what you say, so they might as well
> do everything in their power to stop you.
>
> We keep coming back to this - in-place specific security measures are
> generally worth very little in actual security.
>
> There's much discussion out there on this, but here's the obligitory
> Schneier link, from which I quote:
>
> "What that means is that a basic cursory screening is good enough. If
> I were investing in security, I would fund significant research into
> computer-assisted screening equipment for both checked and carry-on
> bags, but wouldn't spend a lot of money on invasive screening
> procedures and secondary screening. I would much rather have
> well-trained security personnel wandering around the airport, both in
> and out of uniform, looking for suspicious actions.
> [...]
>
> And if I were investing in security, I would invest in intelligence
> and investigation. The best time to combat terrorism is before the
> terrorist tries to get on an airplane. The best countermeasures have
> value regardless of the nature of the terrorist plot or the particular
> terrorist target.
>
> In some ways, if we're relying on airport screeners to prevent
> terrorism, it's already too late. After all, we can't keep weapons out
> of prisons. How can we ever hope to keep them out of airports?"
>
> http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/03/airport_passeng.html


--
WBR,
Max Tulyev (MT6561-RIPE, 2:463/253@FIDO)


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