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more on Hayden's Mistaken Understanding of the Fourth


From: David Farber <dave () farber net>
Date: Sat, 6 May 2006 19:40:54 -0400



Begin forwarded message:

From: "Bruce D. Larkin" <bruce.larkin () learnworld com>
Date: May 6, 2006 7:34:10 PM EDT
To: dave () farber net
Subject: more on Hayden's Mistaken Understanding of the Fourth

Dave,

Further comment, if not overload, focused on General Hayden's January 23rd remarks and the exchange with Jonathan Landay. This is at my blog

        http://www.learnworld.com/blog/blog.html

Bruce


Saturday, May 06, 2006
? MICHAEL V. HAYDEN: ŒREASONABLE¹ SURVEILLANCE?

General Michael V. Hayden has been identified by unnamed newspaper sources as a frontrunner to be named Director of Central Intelligence in place of Porter Goss, whose resignation was announced today.

In January 2006 General Hayden advanced a remarkable theory to vitiate the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution and justify unwarranted interception and use of communications to and from ³U.S. persons,² principally US citizens. In a speech at the National Press Club [1] General Hayden said, in part:

³Inherent foreign intelligence value is one of the metrics we must use. Let me repeat that: Inherent foreign intelligence value is one of the metrics we must use to ensure that we conform to the Fourth Amendment¹s reasonable standard when it comes to protecting the privacy of these kinds of people. ... [T]he standard of what was relevant and valuable, and therefore, what was reasonable, would understandably change, I think, as smoke billowed from two American cities and a Pennsylvania farm field. And we acted accordingly.²


The Fourth Amendment states: ³The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.²

After General Hayden had delivered his remarks the floor was opened for questions. The following exchange took place between Hayden and Jonathan Landay of Knight-Ridder:

QUESTION: Jonathan Landay with Knight Ridder. I¹d like to stay on the same issue, and that had to do with the standard by which you use to target your wiretaps. I¹m no lawyer, but my understanding is that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution specifies that you must have probable cause to be able to do a search that does not violate an American¹s right against unlawful searches and seizures. Do you use ‹

GEN. HAYDEN: No, actually ‹ the Fourth Amendment actually protects all of us against unreasonable search and seizure.

QUESTION: But the ‹

GEN. HAYDEN: That¹s what it says.

QUESTION: But the measure is probable cause, I believe.

GEN. HAYDEN: The amendment says unreasonable search and seizure.

QUESTION: But does it not say probable ‹

GEN. HAYDEN: No. The amendment says ‹

QUESTION: The court standard, the legal standard ‹

GEN. HAYDEN: ‹ unreasonable search and seizure.

QUESTION: The legal standard is probable cause, General. You used the terms just a few minutes ago, ³We reasonably believe.² And a FISA court, my understanding is, would not give you a warrant if you went before them and say ³we reasonably believe²; you have to go to the FISA court, or the attorney general has to go to the FISA court and say, ³we have probable cause.² And so what many people believe ‹ and I¹d like you to respond to this ‹ is that what you¹ve actually done is crafted a detour around the FISA court by creating a new standard of ³reasonably believe² in place in probable cause because the FISA court will not give you a warrant based on reasonable belief, you have to show probable cause. Could you respond to that, please?

GEN. HAYDEN: Sure. I didn¹t craft the authorization. I am responding to a lawful order. All right? The attorney general has averred to the lawfulness of the order. Just to be very clear ‹ and believe me, if there¹s any amendment to the Constitution that employees of the National Security Agency are familiar with, it¹s the Fourth. And it is a reasonableness standard in the Fourth Amendment. And so what you¹ve raised to me ‹and I¹m not a lawyer, and don¹t want to become one ‹ what you¹ve raised to me is, in terms of quoting the Fourth Amendment, is an issue of the Constitution. The constitutional standard is ³reasonable.² And we believe ‹ I am convinced that we are lawful because what it is we¹re doing is reasonable.

From General Hayden¹s reading of the Fourth Amendment it follows that the State must seek a search warrant only when it proposes an unreasonablesearch. Reductio ad absurdum.

Or we could ask how Œreasonableness¹ is established, and how the issue is resolved if the State¹s claim to Œreasonableness¹ of a specific search‹here a program of interceptions‹is contested. General Hayden¹s position is that he, as Director of NSA, determined Œreasonableness¹; that the program was and ought to have remained secret; and that therefore only those who were properly privy to the secret could have contested it, and then only within the limited circle of those entitled to the secret. Hence Congressional oversight or appeal to the Courts is precluded, unless someone who has learned about the secret intercept program goes public.

General Hayden¹s position also neglects the fact that there is law‹an Act of Congress‹which expressly prohibits what he chose to do as Director of the NSA and defended in January as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence.

Title 50 § 1802(a)(1) authorizes warrantless electronic surveillance to acquire foreign intelligence information, subject to some conditions, provided ³there is no substantial likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of the communication to which a United States person is a party;² [This distinguishes ³content² from facts that might be gathered about a transaction.] Note that one US person is enough. Title 18 § 2511 (2)(f) states in part that ³the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 shall be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance ... and the interception of domestic wire, oral, and electronic communications may be conducted.² One term, setting scope, is domestic. For domestic surveillance FISA provides the ³exclusive means². If domestic surveillance does not follow the terms of the FISA Act it is illegal. Of course, as everyone including the chairman and ranking member of the Senate Judiciary Committee has said, we don¹t know exactly what NSA did, because they won¹t say. Secret.

We can, however, work General Hayden¹s language a bit further. Not every person in the United States is a ³United States person², despite General Hayden¹s attempt to convince his audience that any terrorist who stepped across the border would become protected from surveillance. In General Hayden¹s words ³And by the way, ŒU.S. person¹ routinely includes anyone in the United States, citizen or not.² But 50 USC §1801(i) defines a ³United States person² as ³a citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in section 1101(a)(20) of Title 8)² and further defined associations and corporations. [3] ³So, for example,² Hayden continues, ³because they were in the United States‹and we did not know anything more‹Mohamed Atta and his fellow 18 hijackers would have been presumed to have been protected person, U.S. persons, by NSA prior to 9/11.² But not thereafter? What General Hayden does not put on the table is that the law does not ban intercepts but distinguishes those intercepts which may be made without warrant, with Executive approval from those which may only be undertaken pursuant to court-issued warrant, subject to the conditions stipulated in law. The plain meaning of General Hayden¹s subsequent lines is that the communications of US persons are intercepted and judged, despite the law. ³If the U.S. person information isn¹t relevant, the data is suppressed.²

Whether General Hayden is actually nominated to succeed Porter Goss as CIA Director or not, the claim that the Executive can undertake warrantless interception whenever it says that doing so is Œreasonable¹ is pernicious and should be confronted head on. Hayden¹s remaining as Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence after his January 23rd remarks is further evidence of problems which few Congressional Republicans, and no one in the White House, seems inclined or ready to address.

[Note 1]: Remarks by General Michael V. Hayden, Principal Deputy Director of National Intelligence and Former Director of the National Security Agency, Address to the National Press Club, ³What American Intelligence & Especially the NSA Have Been Doing to Defend the Nation,² Natonal Press Club, Washington, D. C., January 23 2006. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2006/01/hayden012306.pdf

[Note 2:] http://www4.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/ usc_sec_50_00001809----000-.html

[Note 3:] And the Congressional Research Service called attention to this definition in Elizabeth B. Basan, ³The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the Statutory Framework and Recent Judicial Decisions,² 22 September 2004, CRS Report RL30465, p. 11 note.
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Bruce D. Larkin
Convenor and Director of Studies
Global Collaborative on Denuclearization Design  http://www.gcdd.net/

Sometime Professor of Politics, University of California at Santa Cruz

Email: "Bruce D. Larkin [+]" <bruce.larkin () learnworld com>
The [+] flags incoming mail as wanted, avoiding loss amid SPAM.
Web:    http://www.learnworld.com/  and http://www.gcdd.net/
Mobile: +1-413-695-0264
Landlines: +1-413-634-8842. +353-23-40309. +1-831-429-8443.

Course Syllabi:   http://www.learnworld.com/COURSES/

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