C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

C.I.A. Aides Feel Pressure in Preparing Iraqi Reports

March 23, 2003
By JAMES RISEN 




 

WASHINGTON, March 22 - The recent disclosure that reports
claiming Iraq tried to buy uranium from Niger were based
partly on forged documents has renewed complaints among
analysts at the C.I.A. about the way intelligence related
to Iraq has been handled, several intelligence officials
said. 

Analysts at the agency said they had felt pressured to make
their intelligence reports on Iraq conform to Bush
administration policies.

For months, a few C.I.A. analysts have privately expressed
concerns to colleagues and Congressional officials that
they have faced pressure in writing intelligence reports to
emphasize links between Saddam Hussein's government and Al
Qaeda. 

As the White House contended that links between Mr. Hussein
and Al Qaeda justified military action against Iraq, these
analysts complained that reports on Iraq have attracted
unusually intense scrutiny from senior policy makers within
the Bush administration.

"A lot of analysts have been upset about the way the
Iraq-Al Qaeda case has been handled," said one intelligence
official familiar with the debate.

That debate was renewed after the disclosure two weeks ago
by Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, the head of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, that the claim that Iraq sought to
buy uranium from Niger was based partly on forged
documents. The claim had been cited publicly by President
Bush. 

"The forgery heightened people's feelings that they were
being embarrassed by the way Iraqi intelligence has been
handled," said one government official who has talked with
C.I.A. analysts about the issue.

The forged documents were not created by the C.I.A. or any
other United States government agency, and C.I.A. officials
were always suspicious of the documents, American
intelligence officials said.

But the information still ended up being used in public by
Mr. Bush. Intelligence officials said there was other
information, which was deemed to be credible, that raised
concerns about a possible uranium connection between Niger
and Iraq. 

Several analysts have told colleagues they have become so
frustrated that they have considered leaving the agency,
according to government officials who have talked with the
analysts. 

"Several people have told me how distraught they have been
about what has been going on," said one government official
who said he had talked with several C.I.A. analysts. None
of the analysts are willing to talk directly to news
organizations, the official said.

A senior official of the agency said no analysts had told
C.I.A. management that they were resigning in protest over
the handling of Iraqi intelligence. At the State
Department, by contrast, three foreign service officers
have resigned in protest over Mr. Bush's policies.

The official said some analysts had been frustrated that
they had frequently been asked the same questions by
officials from throughout the government about their
intelligence reports concerning Iraq. Many of these
questions concern sourcing, the official said.

The official added that the analysts had not been pressured
to change the substance of their reports.

"As we have become an integral component informing the
debate for policy makers, we have been asked a lot of
questions," the senior C.I.A. official said. "I'm sure it
does come across as a pressured environment for analysts. I
think there is a sense of being overworked, a sense among
analysts that they have already answered the same
questions. But if you talk to analysts, they understand why
people are asking, and why policy makers aren't accepting a
report at face value."

Another intelligence official said, however, that many
veteran analysts were comparing the current climate at the
agency to that of the early 1980's, when some C.I.A.
analysts complained that they were under pressure from the
Reagan administration to take a harder line on intelligence
reports relating to the Soviet Union.

The official said the pressure had prompted the agency's
analysts to become more circumspect in expressing their
analytical views in the intelligence reports they produced.


"On topics of very intense concern to the administration of
the day, you become less of an analyst and more of a
reports officer," the official said.

The distinction between an analyst and a reports officer is
an important one within the C.I.A. A reports officer
generally pulls together information in response to
questions and specific requests for information. An
intelligence analyst analyzes the information in finished
reports.

http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/23/international/worldspecial/23CIA.html?ex=1
049425830&ei=1&en=d269de9a50e80b93



HOW TO ADVERTISE
---------------------------------
For information on advertising in e-mail newsletters
or other creative advertising opportunities with The
New York Times on the Web, please contact
onlinesales () nytimes com or visit our online media
kit at http://www.nytimes.com/adinfo

For general information about NYTimes.com, write to
help () nytimes com.  

Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company


------ End of Forwarded Message

-------------------------------------
You are subscribed as interesting-people () lists elistx com
To manage your subscription, go to
  http://v2.listbox.com/member/?listname=ip

Archives at: http://www.interesting-people.org/archives/interesting-people/