Parmenides' Fallacy and War Against Iraq

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

------ Forwarded Message
From: Jose M Guardia <joseg () guardiasociados com>
Date: Mon, 10 Mar 2003 19:26:27 +0100
To: dave () farber net
Subject: Parmenides' Fallacy and War Against Iraq

Dave,

This article was on today's NYTimes, and I thought it may add some
interesting points to the current debate. Thanks for sharing all these
views with all of us. As for your editorial statement, I think that it's
important to receive all kinds of information, because one can only be sure
of his opinions when confronted with opposing views, not when kept drinkink
his own bathwater, so to speak.

Best regards,

Jose M. Guardia


Original URL: <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/03/10/opinion/10BOBB.html>

March 10, 2003
Today's War Is Against Tomorrow's Iraq
By PHILIP BOBBITT

AUSTIN, Tex.
President Bush has again made his case for war against Iraq, and again his
primary argument is the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to America. The
president's critics are quick to point out that the Central Intelligence
Agency and other experts feel that, for the moment, Saddam Hussein is
unlikely to conduct terrorist attacks against America. However, they warn
us, if an invasion threatens his regime, his agents or his extremist
sympathizers might well attack us — possibly even using weapons of mass
destruction.
So is it really a good idea to press ahead with regime change? Aren't we
better off now than we would be if we invade Iraq and risk setting off a
dreadful response?
These are natural questions, but they are neither logical nor helpful. They
are a prime example in our public discourse of what might be called
"Parmenides' Fallacy" — named after the Greek philosopher who held that all
change was illusion. This fallacy occurs when one tries to assess a future
state of affairs by measuring it against the present, as opposed to
comparing it to other possible futures. Let me give a famous example of
Parmenides' Fallacy in operation.
The turning point in the 1980 presidential race came in a debate when
Ronald Reagan criticized President Jimmy Carter's record by asking the
American people, "Are you better off today than you were four years ago?"
While rhetorically devastating, this question is hardly the way to evaluate
a presidency. After all, the state of the nation will never stay the same
for four years, regardless of who is in office. A more relevant question to
have asked would have been, "Are you better off now than you would have
been if Gerald Ford had continued as president — and if he had had to cope
with rising oil prices, a revolution in Iran, a Russian invasion of
Afghanistan and soaring interest rates?"
Or, consider the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. Are we better off now than
we were the day before we intervened? Probably not. Before that war we knew
where Al Qaeda had its bases and it had not struck since Sept. 11; a number
of American and allied soldiers who became casualties were then alive and
unwounded; public opinion in Pakistan was less hostile to America; there
was a greater measure of sympathy around the world for our losses in New
York and Washington; our economy and confidence in our markets were
stronger.
But let's ask the relevant question: Are we better off today than we would
have been if we had let the Taliban continue arming and sheltering our
Qaeda enemies, many of whom we killed and captured in our intervention?
Clearly, we are vastly better off for having acted.
So, as we look to the future, we must stop debating whether invading Iraq
will result in our being worse down the line than we are right now. We do
not have the option of holding time still — which exposes the biggest flaw
in the "Why Rush to War?" argument. The urgency lies in the fact that every
day Saddam Hussein stays in power he grows richer, the global terrorist
network to which he has access plans further atrocities and (international
inspections notwithstanding) the chance of his acquiring nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons grows. To avoid Parmenides' Fallacy, the question we
must ask is: Will we be better off in the future if we invade Iraq or if we
do not invade?
Those who believe that the status quo can be indefinitely extended through
inspections, then, have an obligation to tell us how the inspectors would
prevent Saddam Hussein from buying a weapon from, say, North Korea — which
would be a rather dramatic change in the status quo.
Supporters of an indefinite inspectors' presence focus on large weapons
like missile launchers that they say we will be able to detect. (Although
Secretary of State Colin Powell's masterful presentation to the Security
Council last month, and our experience hunting for Scuds in the Persian
Gulf war, lead one to question that assumption.) But are they also
considering that in the future we might have to detect and capture weapons
no larger than a case of beer?
Whether they admit it or not, those who favor containment are asking for an
ever more expensive United States armed presence in the region, as well as
perpetual sanctions that crush innocent Iraqis even further. This is
because without troops on his borders, Saddam Hussein would not admit
inspectors, and without the sanctions he could quickly replace whatever
outlawed weapons we are lucky enough to find and destroy.
It is also misguided to believe that the threat of our overwhelming
military force is enough to deter Saddam Hussein from aggression
indefinitely. Were Iraq to get weapons of mass destruction, it would be
able to deter us from interfering in any plans it had to broaden its
control in the Persian Gulf region. Saddam Hussein's ambition to impose his
will on his neighbors is the only reason he has resisted his obligations to
the United Nations for 12 years, at great cost to Iraq.
I recognize that we are running a terrible risk if we put Saddam Hussein's
back against the wall. But unless we are willing to eventually grant him a
free hand in the Persian Gulf, he is bound to act in a way that will put
his back against the wall in the future — after he does acquire nuclear
weapons. At that point, however, the United States would have a
significantly diminished capacity to prevent his aggression. One certainly
cannot imagine an operation like Desert Storm if Iraq were to acquire
nuclear warheads and accurate missiles.
We should also consider the future of the Iraqi civilians. Yes, they would
suffer the horrors of war in the near term, which for a time would be even
worse than life under the sanctions now. But if an American-led
intervention succeeded, the country's oil revenues could once again enrich
its people, as well as its schools, hospitals and financial institutions.
The Iraqis would be much better off after an invasion than they would be
living indefinitely chained to Saddam Hussein. For us, though we live in
relative tranquillity at present, we will at least be far less badly off in
the future if we act now. Parmenides' Fallacy must not paralyze our
imaginations, or our will.

Philip Bobbitt, a law professor at the University of Texas, is author of
"The Shield of Achilles: War, Peace and the Course of History."
Copyright 2003 The New York Times Company | Privacy Policy




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Jose M Guardia
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Ph. [++34] 629-74-26-24  |  E-mail: joseg () guardiasociados com
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