Privacy Matters: Better Airline Safety Is in the Bag

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

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Date: Fri, 11 Apr 2003 08:34:11 -0400 (EDT)
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Subject: Privacy Matters: Better Airline Safety Is in the Bag


APRIL 10, 2003 
Business Week

PRIVACY MATTERS 
By Jane Black 


Better Airline Safety Is in the Bag

    
Matching checked luggage to actual passengers is required everywhere but in
the U.S. Why is the TSA so stubbornly resisting?
Since September 11, hundreds of new security measures have been put in place
to make Americans safer, or at least feel safer. Hotels and corporate
offices now require guests to present a photo ID at check-ins and entrances.
Airlines refuse to let passengers carry tweezers, nail files, knitting
needles, and razor blades on flights. The U.S. Patriot Act, passed just six
weeks after the attacks, expanded the government's ability to wiretap
American citizens -- powers that'll be in effect until 2005. This week,
Republican lawmakers on Capitol Hill are expected to propose legislation
that would allow such snooping permanently.

Sadly, most of these efforts give only the illusion of greater security.
September 11 proved it's easy enough for a terrorist to get a driver's
license. Even the most determined al Qaeda member probably wouldn't succeed
in hijacking a plane with tweezers. And the government has yet to prove that
its new sweeping surveillance powers have succeeded in anything more than
invading personal privacy (see BW Online, 12/18/02, "Snooping in All The
Wrong Places" 
<http://www.businessweek.com:/technology/content/dec2002/tc20021218_8515.htm
> ). 

NO CONNECTION.  At least one surefire way exists to improve security and
protect personal privacy: positive passenger bag matching. It would require
that no checked bag be transported on a plane if its owner doesn't board the
flight. Bag-matching became standard practice in Europe and Asia in the
1980s after suitcase bombs brought down Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie,
Air India's Flight 182 en route to London, and UTA's Flight 772 to Paris. In
all three cases, the terrorists weren't on board.

Yet, here in the U.S. -- where security is supposedly now top priority --
authorities have chosen to ignore bag-matching. Instead, the Transportation
Safety Administration (TSA) has embraced largely untested
electronic-detection systems that screen bags for bombs and other
explosives. 

As of Jan. 1, the TSA is required to match bags only if an
electronic-scanning device to detect bombs isn't available. Agency
spokeswoman Chris Rhatigan says 100% of bags are screened by
"congressionally approved methods," which include electronic scanning, K-9
teams, hand searches, and bag-matching. And that's just on originating
flights. Bags aren't required to be scanned or matched before a connecting
flight. Rhatigan declined to elaborate because of the "sensitive nature of
the information." 

DOMESTIC DISPUTE.  Sensitive, indeed. Critics charge that the overriding
reason the TSA has overlooked such an obvious, sensible security measure is
because U.S. airlines have opposed bag-matching for years. They fear it
might delay flights and persuade short-haul travelers to take a train or
drive instead. 

In 1996, after the deadly crash of TWA Flight 800, a commission headed by
then Vice-President Al Gore recommended bag-matching on all originating and
connecting flights. In 1998, the airlines agreed to institute it on all
international flights. For domestic flights, airlines agreed only to
searches of passengers selected by a computerized screening system.

After September 11, bag-matching was back on the agenda. Yet struggling
airlines complained that implementing it on all domestic flights would drive
them into bankruptcy. In November, 2001, Delta (DAL ) CEO Leo Mullins warned
that complete bag-matching would force his carrier to reduce operations by
25%. Industry lobbyists complained that it would add "zero" security
benefit. Airlines also argued that the use of sophisticated explosives
detectors makes the practice superfluous.

MINOR DELAYS.  Such claims have zero merit, says Arnold Barnett, a professor
at MIT's Sloan School of Management and a former chair of the Federal
Aviation Administration's technical team. In 1996, the team was asked to
investigate the feasibility of bag-matching. In a 1997 experiment, which
tested 11 airlines, 50 pairs of cities, 8,000 flights, and 750,000
passengers, Barnett showed that domestic bag-matching would cause delays
averaging seven minutes on only one in seven flights and would require no
reduction in flight schedules. The cost: 40 cents per passenger on average
-- far less than the $2.50 tax that's levied on airline tickets to pay for
TSA security. Voluntary bag-matching by JetBlue (JBLU ) and Frontier
Airlines (FRNT ) this year have resulted in short delays on about 3% of
flights. 

Moreover, electronic-detection systems are anything but perfect.
Representative John Mica (D-Fla.) who chairs a House Aviation subcommittee,
calls the system "semi-ineffective" because terrorists are always developing
new explosives that electronic-detection machines might miss. One clever
terrorist designed a bomb intended for a jetliner with the thickness of wax
paper, which he then built into the frame of a suitcase. Only the security
skills of Israel's El Al foiled the plot.

Barnett argues that bag-matching would deter bombers far more than
electronic-detection systems. It ensures that the terrorist will proceed to
the gate to board his plane. If, while he's waiting, detection devices
reveal a bomb, he could be quickly located and arrested. Without
bag-matching, he more than likely will already have left the airport. "The
combination of bag-match and explosives detection could be far more potent
than either measure on its own," Barnett wrote in a Dec. 17 letter to TSA
chief Admiral James Loy. He received a thank you note that contained no
indication the TSA is contemplating action.

GOT A LIGHT?  Why is the TSA turning its back on such sensible security?
"There are lots of agendas that have nothing to do with security working
behind the scenes," says Bruce Schneier, a security expert who has written
extensively about the trade-off between security and privacy. For example,
Schneier says the airlines embraced mandatory photo IDs in the 1990s because
that clamped down on the black market for tickets. Tweezers, nail files,
razor blades, and knitting needles are forbidden in carry-on luggage. But
matches and lighters, which could be used to ignite explosives, aren't, even
though it's forbidden to smoke in airports or on any flight.

Those silly security measures don't make me feel safer. And they won't deter
terrorists. The government spends a lot of time talking about the necessary
trade-offs between security and privacy. Yet, bag-matching is a solution
that would make everyone safer without invading privacy, making it just the
kind of solution that security and privacy advocates should agree on.


Black <mailto:jane_black () businessweek com>  covers privacy issues for
BusinessWeek Online in her twice-monthly Privacy Matters
<http://www.businessweek.com:/bwdaily/list/privacy01.htm>  column
Edited by Douglas Harbrecht


Copyright 2000-2003, by The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc. All rights reserved.
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