interesting analysis...

[Dave Farber <dave () farber net>]

------ Forwarded Message
From: Simon Higgs <simon () higgs com>
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 2003 13:24:37 -0700
To: dave () farber net
Subject: Fwd: interesting analysis...


> > THE STRATFOR WEEKLY
> > 10 April 2003
> >
> > by Dr. George Friedman
> >
> > After Iraq: The Ongoing Crisis
> >
> > Summary
> >
> > As the war in Iraq moves toward a conclusion, the expectations
> > are that the end of the war will bring at least a pause in
> > international tensions. We do not believe this will be the case.
> > Given U.S. war goals, crises -- inside Iraq, with nations along
> > Iraq's border and between Europe and the United States -- can be
> > expected to flow directly from war termination, whenever it
> > comes. As we have said, Iraq is a campaign in a much larger war
> > and not a war in itself. We now will see what that means.
> >
> > Analysis
> >
> > Stratfor has argued that the United States had two fundamental
> > reasons for invading Iraq:
> >
> > 1. To transform the psychology of the Islamic world, which had
> > perceived the United States as in essence weak and unwilling to
> > take risks to achieve its ends.
> >
> > 2. To use Iraq as a strategic base of operations from which to
> > confront Islamic regimes that are either incapable of or
> > unwilling to deny al Qaeda and other Islamist groups access to
> > enabling resources.
> >
> > The war in Iraq is not over: There are extraordinarily complex
> > politico-military missions to confront. This is particularly true
> > in the north, where some substantial Iraqi forces appear to
> > remain and where the political situation among various players --
> > Kurdish, Turkish, Iranian and Syrian -- remains complex, dynamic
> > and opaque. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some assessment
> > of the intended and unintended consequences of the war.
> >
> > There already has been a strong impact on the psychology of the
> > Arab world in particular. During the run-up to the war and until
> > the last week, there existed a sense of growing anger and
> > radicalization. With the collapse of resistance in Baghdad, this
> > has given way to a sense of stunned disbelief. The Arab press
> > appears to be filled with four themes:
> >
> > 1. A sense of denial, and an insistence that resistance continued
> > but was being hidden by the world press.
> >
> > 2. A sense of betrayal by Saddam Hussein, whose failure to resist
> > effectively was seen as a sign of corruption.
> >
> > 3. A sense of hopelessness, expressing the view that resisting
> > the United States is beyond the capacity of Arabs. This was
> > coupled at times with an expression of determination to rectify
> > the situation.
> >
> > 4. Bitterness at Europe -- particularly France and Russia, which
> > abandoned Iraq to its fate.
> >
> > U.S. leaders understand that the result of the war will be
> > increased bitterness, although some argue that Arab bitterness
> > was already maxed out anyway. What they are driving for with this
> > operation is a psychological capitulation -- a sense that
> > accommodation with the United States is the only path.
> >
> > The United States certainly has inflicted a massive blow on the
> > Arab, if not the Islamic, psyche. The only comparable moment was
> > in June 1967, when Israeli forces defeated the Egyptians, Syrians
> > and Jordanians. It should be remembered that the defeat had
> > unintended consequences: Not only did Egypt and Syria attack
> > Israel with some effect in 1973, but the consequences of the
> > defeat energized the Palestinian movement. The Israelis have
> > begun warning the Palestinians to think through the lessons of
> > Iraq. On the other side, the United States must carefully think
> > through the lessons of 1967.
> >
> > The simplistic idea that resentment of the United States will
> > generate effective action by Arabs misses a crucial point. Two
> > scales are at work here: the radicalism scale and the hope scale.
> > On the radicalism scale, the level of radicalism and anti-
> > Americanism in the Arab world has been off the chart for months.
> > Increasing the level would be difficult. However, radicalism by
> > itself does not lead to action. There must also be hope -- a
> > sense that there are weaknesses in the U.S. position that can be
> > exploited, that there is some possibility of victory, however
> > distant. So long as the hope scale tends toward hopelessness,
> > radicalism can be intense.
> >
> > The United States was prepared to allow the radicalism scale to
> > go deep into the danger zone, but Washington has been trying to
> > keep the hope scale deeply in the green zone. Israel's failure
> > after 1967 was inherent in its position: The Israelis depended
> > heavily on outsiders for national security. The Arab perception
> > was that the Israelis could be attacked by splitting them from
> > their patrons. This sense of vulnerability led to an active
> > response to defeat.
> >
> > The task facing the United States now is to avoid projecting a
> > sense of vulnerability. This is easier for Washington than it was
> > for Israel. The United States comes out of the war less dependent
> > on others; it also has a strong domestic consensus in favor of
> > the war. The United States presents, at the moment, a seamless
> > face to the Arab world: It is hated but feared. Washington now
> > must act now to maintain the fear, while reducing hatred. How it
> > manages Iraq will determine the outcome. If the United States
> > loses control of the situation, it quickly could lead to a
> > perception of vulnerability. It must control the situation in
> > Iraq while maintaining a benign administration. This will not be
> > as easy it sounds: Where Washington can choose between
> > unrelenting strength and the risk of perceived weakness, it will
> > have to carefully choose strength. That is implicit in the
> > strategy.
> >
> > From a geopolitical perspective, we already have seen the United
> > States transiting from the Iraqi war phase toward confrontation
> > with the surrounding states. Saudi leaders capitulated in
> > fundamental ways before the United States went to war, permitting
> > U.S. aircraft to fly air strikes against Iraq and allowing U.S.
> > forces to pass through Saudi territory. Jordan and Kuwait are not
> > problems. But there are three issues: Syria, Turkey and Iran.
> >
> > * Syria: Syrian behavior has become unpredictable. The Syrians
> > have long understood that, as a consequence of the war, their
> > country would be surrounded by three enemies: the United States,
> > Turkey and Israel. Rather than trying to reach an accommodation
> > with the United States, Damascus stepped up its aggressive
> > behavior during the war, permitting volunteers to go into Iraq to
> > fight coalition forces and apparently permitting Iraqi personnel
> > to seek shelter in Iraq. The Bush administration has made it
> > clear that it finds Syrian behavior intolerable, and Defense
> > Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has refused to rule out assertive
> > action against Syria. There was no question but that the United
> > States was going to confront Syria at some point from its bases
> > in Iraq, but the Syrians seem to have chosen to accelerate the
> > process -- perhaps feeling that a better settlement could be
> > reached earlier in the game.
> >
> > * Turkey: Washington needs to defuse the bad end to the pre-war
> > confrontation. Turkey is a geopolitical foundation of U.S.
> > strategy -- not only in the Middle East, but also north of the
> > Caucasus, in southeastern Europe and Iran. A permanent rift with
> > Turkey would be intolerable. Similarly, the United States remains
> > the foundation of Turkish national security policy. Without it,
> > Turkey has fundamental problems. The two countries may not be
> > friends at the moment, but they share fundamental interests. Both
> > nations now will attempt to extract themselves from the
> > unacceptable situation they created for each other. The key will
> > be limiting Kurdish expectations.
> >
> > * Iran: the extraordinarily complex game that Tehran is playing
> > makes Syrian foreign policy transparent. Iran has positioned
> > itself in such a way that its pro-Iranian Shiite groups in Iraq
> > could wage a guerrilla war against the United States, while
> > Tehran holds open the possibility of reaching implicit
> > accommodations with the United States -- all at the same time.
> > Iranian subtlety notwithstanding, Washington regards Iran as the
> > single most potentially dangerous regime in the region, because
> > of both its resources and the complexity of its politics and
> > policies. Iran has positioned itself to be fundamentally
> > unpredictable -- and having achieved this goal, it concerns the
> > United States tremendously.
> >
> > Therefore, if the goal of the United States was to create a base
> > of operations in Iraq from which to influence the dynamics of the
> > region internally, the game is in play even before the war is
> > formally ended. The Syrian situation will probably be contained,
> > but it represents a fundamentally destabilizing factor to the
> > region. The Iranian situation is much more difficult to predict
> > in the long run, even as the Iranians practice their
> > traditionally complex prudence in the short run.
> >
> > In a similar sense, unintended consequences of the war must be
> > managed. The U.S. relationship with Britain is fundamental to
> > U.S. national strategy -- and Britain, for a host of its own
> > reasons, does not want an outright breach either with the Franco-
> > German bloc or with multilateral organizations like the United
> > Nations. The United States must accommodate the British without
> > losing control of the situation in Iraq.
> >
> > The primary purpose of the April 11-12 summit in St. Petersburg
> > between Russian, German and French leaders is to find a way to
> > limit the consequences of U.S. victory in Iraq. All of them
> > opposed the war, and the United States prosecuted it any way.
> > This demonstrated that Washington needs neither material support
> > from Europe nor political validation. For all three countries,
> > this represents a fundamental redefinition of their place in the
> > world. There had been a fixed assumption that in some sense, the
> > United States remained dependent on them, that they were
> > necessary enablers for global actions. Alliance for them was not
> > an American choice, but a necessity. Iraq represented a very
> > public demonstration that they were irrelevant to U.S.
> > policymaking, either individually or collectively. This
> > represents a geopolitical crisis of the first order to them.
> >
> > These countries' solution will be to try to manipulate the United
> > States into accepting the United Nations as the primary manager
> > of Iraqi affairs. To do so, they will use the British desire to
> > maintain bridges to the Franco-German bloc as a means of forcing
> > the United States to shift policy. The United States cannot
> > abandon control of Iraq without abandoning the goals for which it
> > fought the war. This undoubtedly will lead to another round of
> > unpleasantness with the Euro Three, which would not bother
> > Washington a bit. U.S. President George W. Bush is positioned
> > domestically to take advantage of resentment -- particularly of
> > France -- so that their demand to participate in governing Iraq
> > will be taken as wanting the fruits of victory without taking the
> > risks. The British, however, will be another matter. We expect to
> > see growing strains between the two countries as Britain tries to
> > find balance.
> >
> > What we are getting at is that no postwar lull is possible here,
> > even if there does emerge a clear-cut end to the war. The two
> > goals of the war need immediate management. The management of
> > Arab and Islamic public opinion requires exquisite care in the
> > management of internal Iraqi affairs. It also requires that U.S.
> > power in the region be perceived as irresistible. This means that
> > U.S. relations with Syria and Iran must be managed aggressively
> > but without crossing the line to unwarranted belligerence. It
> > means that the U.S.-Turkish relationship must be managed
> > dispassionately, in spite of underlying tensions. All of this is
> > urgent. None of it will wait. Finally, the pre-war battle with
> > the Europeans, while undoubtedly more subdued, still will define
> > much of the global rhetoric -- save that given its stakes in the
> > Islamic world, the United States will be even less able and less
> > inclined to cooperate with European demands.
> >
> > Now things get really tricky.
> >
> > ...................................................................
> >
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