IP: Saudi/U.S. relations on a razor edge

[David Farber <dave () farber net>]

AA

Marriage of Convenience: The U.S.-Saudi Alliance Saudi Leader's Anger 
Revealed Shaky Ties Bush's Response Eased a Deep Rift On Mideast Policy; 
Then Came Sept. 11

On Aug. 24, Crown Prince Abdullah ibn Abdulaziz, the leader of Saudi 
Arabia, was in his palace in Riyadh watching President Bush's televised 
news conference in Texas when Bush was asked about the Israeli-Palestinian 
"peace process," which had again been undermined by a new round of violence.

"The Israelis will not negotiate under terrorist threat, simple as that," 
Bush said.

"And if the Palestinians are interested in a dialogue, then I strongly urge 
Mr. Arafat to put 100 percent effort into.

And I believe he can do a better job of doing that."

Abdullah interpreted the president's remarks as absolving Israel and 
blaming Yasser Arafat, the Palestinian leader, for worsening conditions, 
according to a senior Saudi official.

An impulsive, emotional man, Abdullah "just went bananas," the same 
official said.

The crown prince picked up the telephone and called his ambassador to the 
United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, who was watching the same news 
conference at his palatial residence in Aspen, Colo.

Abdullah said he wanted Bandar to see Bush at once and deliver a harsh 
message, the culmination of months of tension between Saudi Arabia and the 
new Bush administration.

"We believe there has been a strategic decision by the United States that 
its national interest in the Middle East is 100-percent based on [Israeli 
Prime Minister Ariel] Sharon."

This was America's right, the message continued, but Saudi Arabia could not 
accept the decision.

"Starting from today, you're from Uruguay, as they say.

You [Americans] go your way, I [Saudi Arabia] go my way.

From now on, we will protect our national interests, regardless of where 
America's interests lie in the region."

As had often happened in the past, these two countries -- intimate 
strangers in many respects -- had not really been hearing each other.

What can cause trouble is the realization that these two allies have very 
little in common beyond security and oil.

Saudi money greased the relationship and supported U.S. policy goals from 
Afghanistan to Nicaragua, while Saudi leaders often defended U.S. interests 
in the councils of Arab states.

Sept. 11 and its aftermath confronted Americans with the impolite fact that 
their principal Arab ally is a theocratic monarchy that has supported 
Islamic fundamentalism throughout the Muslim world.

These articles will explore the evolution of this "special relationship" 
and examine its uncertain future as Bush presses the U.S. war on terrorism 
beyond Afghanistan.

They are based on official documents and more than 60 interviews with U.S. 
officials and senior Saudi analysts and officials, many of whom insisted on 
anonymity.

Saudis, who know about dynasties, had high expectations for the son.

Abdullah, Saudi Arabia's de facto ruler because of the prolonged 
incapacitation of King Fahd, his half-brother, became increasingly angry, 
according to Saudi sources.

Bush invited him to visit Washington, Camp David, his ranch in Crawford, 
even the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, N.Y. -- a venue 
proposed because Roosevelt and Abdullah's father, King Abdulaziz, known 
also as ibn Saud, established the modern Saudi-American relationship in a 
meeting onboard a ship on the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal in 1945.

Official Saudi television showed extensive film clips of the fighting and 
of Israel's forceful military actions in nearly every news broadcast.

Altogether, said Adel Jubeir, a foreign policy adviser to Abdullah, "where 
he stood was not that much different from where Clinton stood when he left 
office."

A particularly important passage in Bush's businesslike, two-page letter, 
Saudi officials said, was his response to Abdullah's complaints about the 
ways Israelis were treating Palestinians in the occupied territories.

It is impossible to say what might have happened if Bush had not so quickly 
mollified the crown prince at the end of August.

According to well-placed sources, the Saudis had conveyed to the United 
States their intention to convene an emergency summit meeting of Arab 
leaders to offer full support to the Palestinians.

They alluded to the possibility of ending all law enforcement and 
intelligence cooperation with the United States -- of which there had been 
a great deal.

And they signaled their intention to reconsider the Saudi-U.S.

Abdullah made this last threat virtually explicit.

On Aug. 24, the Saudi chief of staff, Gen.

Salih Ali bin Muhayya, arrived in Washington for a high-level review of 
Saudi-U.S.

On the 25th, when he spoke to Bandar by telephone, Abdullah ordered that 
Salih return immediately to Riyadh, without meeting any Americans.

He also ordered a delegation of about 40 senior Saudi officers who were 
about to leave for Washington to get off their plane.

The annual review of military relations was canceled.

"You don't cancel visits like this on the day before," said a senior 
adviser to the crown prince.

"It was a big, big event, and we downplayed it completely."

In fact, the cancellation received no public attention at all.

But it shocked the Pentagon, according to a senior Defense Department 
official who had expected to join the meetings with the Saudis.

Bush's letter transformed his reputation in the small circle of Saudis who 
run their country.

Before the letter, these people had come to the conclusion that Bush was a 
lightweight -- "goofy," as one of them put it.

His reputation went from rock bottom to sky high."

Abdullah decided to share his correspondence with Bush -- his message 
delivered by Bandar, which filled 25 pages, and Bush's two-page reply -- 
with other Arab leaders, including the presidents of Egypt and Syria and 
the king of Jordan.

He summoned Arafat, who was in South Africa, to Riyadh to read it.

According to Saudi officials, they extracted from Arafat a written pledge 
to satisfy Bush's demands for what Arafat had to do to revive the peace 
talks, and they sent it back to Washington with their own enthusiastic 
reply to Bush's letter.

Saudi Arabia would continue to try to protect U.S. interests, he promised.

The Americans indicated a willingness to pursue a new Mideast initiative 
immediately, Saudi officials said -- a sharp departure from the 
administration's policy for seven months.

After months in what he called "a yellow mood" over the deteriorating 
situation in the Middle East, "suddenly I felt the same feeling I had as we 
were going to Madrid [to the peace conference that followed the Gulf War in 
1991], that we really were going to have a major initiative here that could 
save all of us from ourselves -- mostly -- and from each other."

So "the happiest man in the world that night, on Monday night, was Bandar 
bin Sultan.

Staff researcher Madonna Lebling contributed to this report.




> http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A51555-2002Feb9.html

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